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Yu, Ji. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August, 2015. Three Essays on IPO: the New 
Regulation and Initial Public Offering Underpricing Phenomenon. Major Professor: 
Zabihollah Rezaee, Ph.D. 
This dissertation presents three papers that examine the impact of a new 
regulation, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) 2012, and initial public 
offering underpricing phenomenon. I study cost and benefit of the JOBS Act and human 
capital’s impact on IPO underpricing in this dissertation.  Specifically, paper 1 and paper 
2 examine consequences of the JOBS Act. And paper 3 examines human capital’s impact 
on IPO underpricing.  
Paper 1 studies impact of the JOBS Act on IPO’s direct cost and indirect cost 
(underpricing). By collecting related information from three years pre-Act and three years 
post-Act, I find that the passage of the JOBS Act significantly increases the IPO indirect 
cost and decreases IPO direct cost. Voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds is an 
important strategy that JOBS Act affected firms use to decrease the information 
asymmetry. Both ordinary least square method and difference-in-difference method are 
used to support my results.  
Paper 2 studies the consequences of the JOBS Act. The JOBS Act creates a new 
category of new listed firms, Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs), with a key 
requirement of annual revenue less than $1 billion. EGCs can take advantage of less 
vigorous regulation and less disclosure requirement. Paper 2 examines the financial 
performance and value relevance of EGCs. I find that EGCs’ financial performance is 
weaker than that of non-EGCs and the value relevance of accounting information is lower 
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for EGCs. This study contributes to the literature by documenting unintended 
consequences of the JOBS Act.  
Lastly, paper 3 studies impact of manager ability on IPO underpricing.  My key 
proxy of manager ability follows Demerjian et al. (2012) MA-Score. My results show 
that IPOs with higher manger ability tend to have lower IPO underpricing. This 
association becomes more pronounced if the CEO has higher motivation to monitor the 
IPO process. The findings of this study are valuable to issuing firms considering hiring 
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 This dissertation examines the new regulation Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act 2012’s (the JOBS Act) impact on capital market and IPO underpricing phenomenon.  
 Chapter 2 examines the JOBS Act’s impact on IPO cost. Chapter 3 examines 
Emerging Growth Companies’ (EGCs) financial performance and value relevance. 
Chapter 4 examines managerial ability’s impact on IPO underpricing. 
 The JOBS Act was enacted in April 5, 2012 to help EGCs to raise capital without 
facing vigorous regulations. The reduced disclosure requirement and reduced regulations 
for EGCs are expected to decrease the direct cost of IPOs.  Also, the information 
asymmetry theory indicates that the indirect cost of IPOs might increase because of less 
transparency for those EGCs. Chapter 2 sheds light on the IPOs’ indirect cost and direct 
cost change after the passage of the JOBS Act.  The Chapter 2 also examines the role of 
voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds for those EGCs. My sample covers 492 IPOs 
from April 5, 2009 to April 5, 2015.  My results show that IPOs’ indirect cost increases 
after the JOBS Act while the direct cost decreases after the JOBS Act. Also, the effects of 
the JOBS Act on IPO indirect cost and direct cost are weaker for firms that disclose high 
level of voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds.  The Chapter 2 contributes to the 
literature by documenting the effect of the JOBS Act on IPO indirect cost and direct cost.  
 In chapter 3, I study the unintended consequences of the JOBS Act. The JOBS 
Act was enacted in April 5, 2012 to enable EGCs to go public without being subject to 
full vigorous range of regulations applicable to publicly traded companies. Regulators 
aim to create more jobs in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis by reducing the 
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regulation and disclosure requirement for EGCs.  However, concerns from opponents 
indicate that less vigorous regulation of EGCs might lead to detrimental effect to 
investors. To shed light on EGCs’ performance in the capital market, I examine the 
financial performance, Tobin’s Q ratio and value relevance of EGCs which are listed in 
U.S stock exchange between April 5, 2012 and April 5, 2015. My results show that EGCs 
tend to have lower financial performance, higher Tobin’s Q ratio. Also, the value 
relevance of accounting information tends to be lower for EGCs. The Chapter 3 
contributes to the literature by documenting the unintended consequences of the JOBS 
Act 2012.  
In chapter 4, I study human capital’s impact on IPO underpricing. Using a sample 
of 2,964 IPOs during the period from January 1976 to December 2013, I test the impact 
of manager ability on IPO underpricing. The chapter 4 contributes to the literature by 
examining the impact of human capital on IPO underpricing. My results show that IPOs 
with higher manger ability tend to have lower IPO underpricing. This association 
becomes more pronounced if the CEO has higher motivation to monitor the IPO process. 
The findings of chapter 4 are valuable to issuing firms considering hiring higher caliber 










THE JOBS ACT AND IPO INDIRECT COST AND DIRECT COST 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper, I examine the effect of Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 2012 
(thereafter JOBS Act) on IPO indirect cost and direct cost. IPO underpricing is defined as 
pricing an IPO substantially lower than its market value in the first trading day. IPO can 
be underpriced for a variety of reasons including concerns regarding liquidity and 
predictability of demand for IPO, managerial incentives to underprice to compensate for 
liquidity and predictability risks, incentives for investors to participate in the IPO (e.g., 
Beatty and Ritter 1986; Leone and Willenborg 2007; and Ljungqvist 2007). The JOBS 
Act was enacted in April 5, 2012 to enable emerging growth companies (thereafter 
EGCs) to go public without being subject to full vigorous range of regulations applicable 
to publicly traded companies. The goal is to entice EGCs to go public and help EGCs to 
raise capital.  While proponents of the JOBS Act believe that the Act achieves its goal to 
help the small firms to raise capital, opponents of the JOBS Act have concerns that the 
relaxation of the requirement and the reduction of public available information in the IPO 
process for EGCs are related with higher information asymmetry. IPO theory indicates 
that cost of IPO includes two parts: indirect cost and direct cost. Indirect cost refers to the 
positive first day initial return, or underpricing, a phenomenon that illustrates initial 
offering price is frequently set lower than the first day closing price.  Investment bankers 
and institution investors seize this part of return by buying the new shares at a discounted 
initial offering price from the issuers. Direct cost includes the cost of issuance, 
accounting, legal or underwriting fee incurred during the IPO process.  
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In this paper, I examine the cost and benefit of the JOBS Act. Specifically, I 
examine the impact of the JOBS Act on the IPO’s indirect cost and direct cost. I employ 
both ordinary least square (OLS) regression method and difference-in-difference (DID) 
regression method to analyze my sample. While the OLS regression method can identify 
an association relation between the interest independent variable (JOBS Act) and 
dependent variable (IPO cost), the advantage of DID regression model is that it can 
identify a causal relationship between the policy (JOBS Act) and the related consequence 
(IPO cost) by comparing the treatment group with non-treatment group.  
The JOBS Act has significantly changed the process for IPOs to file their 
registration in several ways. Especially, the JOBS Act allows EGCs to present no more 
than two years of audited financial statements in its IPO registration statement as opposed 
to the current rules requiring three years of audited income statements, and five years of 
selected financial data. I posit that the reduced disclosure of information increases 
uncertainty and information asymmetry in the IPO process. Thus, the passage of the 
JOBS Act increases the IPO underpricing for those EGCs. Also, because of the reduced 
disclosure requirement, investment bankers and underwriters spend less effort and offer 
less service for those EGCs. Thus, as regulators and policymakers expect, I also expect 
that the passage of the JOBS Act will decrease new IPOs’ direct filling cost.  
My results show that after the passage of the JOBS Act, indirect cost 
(underpricing) for EGCs increases. Also, the direct cost of IPOs (gross spread) tends to 
move in the right direction that policymakers expect. Specifically, gross spread 
significantly decreases for JOBS affected IPOs after the passage of the JOBS Act. 
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However, I do not find a significant change for gross spread percentage after the JOBS 
Act.  
I also examine the role of voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds for EGCs. 
Especially, I find JOBS Act affected IPOs that disclose less voluntary disclosure of use-
of-proceeds tend to have higher IPO indirect cost (underpricing). I also find that both the 
high voluntary disclosure and low voluntary disclosure JOBS Act affected IPOs tend to 
have lower IPO direct cost. And the high disclosure level JOBS Act affected IPOs tend to 
have even lower IPO direct cost. These results are consistent with Leone and Willenborg 
(2007)’s findings, which show that the use-of-proceeds voluntary disclosure precision is 
useful to reduce IPO information asymmetry and thus is related with lower IPO 
underpricing.  
I use a sample that includes all the IPOs issued in United States from April 5, 
2009 to April 5, 2015. This time period covers three years before the passage of the JOBS 
Act and three years after the passage of the JOBS Act.  After eliminating all the missing 
values in the control variables, my final sample includes 492 IPOs. Specifically, 165 
IPOs are from pre-Act period and 327 IPOs are from post-Act period.  
Section 2 surveys the literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes 
the sample and research design.  Section 4 describes the empirical result. Section 5 
describes the additional test. And section 6 concludes.  
2.  Institutional Background and Literature Review 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) 
The JOBS Act was signed by President Obama, On April 5, 2012. It encourages 
private EGCs with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion to either go public or 
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merge with existing public companies. Regulators’ intention was to enable public 
companies to raise capital and private companies to go public by reducing the regulatory 
burdens of capital raising and ongoing SEC reporting. The JOBS Act allows substantial 
relaxation and loosening of restrictions around the traditional IPO process and post-IPO 
reporting requirements. It loosens investor protections with the goal of creating more jobs 
by reducing disclosure requirements for EGCs that decide to go public. The JOBS Act 
enables buyer-beware offerings through crowd funding which practically permits 
companies to raise money from as many as 2,000 investors privately, compared to 
previous limit of 500 investors. Thus, these 2,000 shareholders are exempted from 
registration requirements under the SEC 34 Act. The JOBS Act presents several 
implications for private company mergers and acquisitions and may promote and affect 
the reverse merger process. The JOBS Act also enables EGCs to file their registration 
statements confidentially so long as the confidential filings are ultimately released at least 
21 days before the IPO. It is expected that EGCs will take advantages of keeping early 
filings confidential in order to pull their deal without the stigma associated with 
withdrawing a publicly filed registration statement and keep the IPO process outside the 
public eye and invisible to prospective acquirers. The JOBS Act provides the opportunity 
for EGCs to undertake a dual-track process instead of the traditional standalone M&A 
process to comply with a more relaxed restrictions on “test the waters” pre-marketing of 
the conventional IPO process. The main concern of the JOBS Act is that its relaxation of 
IPO requirements may be detrimental to investors and the capital market by increasing 




Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Prior research links IPO underpricing to information asymmetry by suggesting 
that information asymmetry “has a first order effect on underpricing” (Ljungqvist 2007).  
Under Ljungqvist’s (2007) framework, IPO underpricing literature can be categorized 
into four streams: asymmetric information, institution reasons, control considerations, 
and behavior approaches. Specifically, asymmetric information theory assumes that one 
of the participating parties knows more than the others. More information asymmetry 
during the IPO process will lead to higher IPO underpricing. Institutional theory indicates 
that companies deliberately sell their stock at a discount to reduce the likelihood of future 
lawsuits from shareholders who might be disappointed with the post-IPO performance of 
their shares. Ownership and control theory indicates that underpricing is a mean for 
managers to reduce intervention by outside investors and to retain the control of the firm. 
Behavior theories show that ‘information cascades’ exists when issuers initiate IPO. Later 
investors can condition their bids on the bids of earlier investors regardless of their own 
information. A successful initial sale is important since it will be interpreted by 
subsequent investors as good signals that earlier investors held favorable information. 
Thus, issuers deliberately issue underpricing shares to ease the difficulty of initial sales. 
            Among the four theories of IPO underpricing, information asymmetry theory 
receives the most empirical supports. For example, Teoh et al. (1998) show that the most 
aggressive earnings management quartile IPOs have 20 percent lower three-year stock 
return than the most conservative earnings management quartile.  Willenborg et al. 
(2001) find that a going concern auditing report can reduce the IPO underpricing by 
suggesting that going concern auditing opinion can reduce the uninformed investors ex 
ante uncertainty about the firm, thus reducing information asymmetry during the IPO 
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process. Leone and Willenborg (2007) find that disclosure of intended use-of-proceeds 
can decrease IPO underpricing significantly. Their results indicate that specific use-of-
proceeds disclosures can reduce investors’ ex ante uncertainty and restrict the dispersion 
of secondary market. Other studies extend the IPO underpricing research to international 
setting and specific country’s setting. For example, Boulton et al. (2011) find that country 
level earnings quality can affect IPO underpricing. Specifically, by examining 37 
countries’ IPOs, their results show that IPOs are underpriced less in countries where 
public firms produce higher earnings quality financial report. Lin et al. (2012) examine 
Chinese data, and show that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with IPO 
underpricing. In summary, previous literature suggests that information asymmetry 
during the IPO process is positively related with IPO underpricing.   
          The main concern of the JOBS Act is that its relaxation of IPO requirements may 
increase information asymmetry during the IPO process: (1) reducing transparency and 
investor protection; (2) making securities law enforcement more difficult which may 
reduce capital markets safety and soundness; and (3) reducing publicly available 
information by exempting EGCs from currently mandated certain disclosure and other 
requirements.  The increased information asymmetry might lead to unfavorable result to 
IPO underpricing. Therefore, the indirect cost after the passage of the JOBS Act will 
increase. Also, the reduced disclosure requirement enables EGCs to buy less service from 
investment bankers. And the IPO process for EGCs needs less effort from investment 
bankers. Thus, the direct cost, which includes the cost of issuance, accounting, legal or 
underwriting fee, may decrease after the JOBS Act as the regulators expect. In 
conclusion, the indirect cost may increase because of increased information asymmetry 
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for EGCs and the direct cost may decrease because of less effort and less service from 
underwriters for EGCs after the JOBS Act. Therefore, I propose the first hypotheses: 
H1a: Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) that comply with loosened rules 
of the JOBS Act incur higher IPO indirect cost. 
H1b: Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) that comply with loosened rules 
of the JOBS Act incur lower IPO direct cost. 
Leone and Willenborg (2007) show that IPOs have different levels of voluntary 
disclosure about the use-of-proceeds in the IPO prospectus. And they find that high level 
of voluntary disclosure offers more useful information in the IPO process and thus 
reduces the information asymmetry. In the H2, I examine whether the effect of the JOBS 
Act on IPO cost varies by different levels of voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds. 
Specifically, I suggest that high level voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds offers 
additional information for those EGCs. Those additional information may make up or fill 
the information gap which results from EGCs’ less disclosure requirement.  Because of 
the additional voluntary disclosure information, I expect that the JOBS Act’s effects on 
IPO cost will be weaker if the EGCs disclose high level of voluntary disclosure of use-of-
proceeds. Thus, I propose my second hypothesis: 
H2: The effects of the JOBS Act on IPO indirect cost and direct cost are 







3.  Sample and Research Design 
Sample 
Based on SEC’s requirement that a company which identifies itself as an 
emerging growth company should disclose its status on the cover page of its prospectus, I 
use a textual search keyword “Emerging Growth” to identify the issuers who opting to be 
an Emerging Growth Company (EGC). 1 
            The cutoff date for IPOs to claim their EGCs status is April 5, 2012. I follow 
Dhaliwal et al. (2007) to create a symmetrical window close to the passage of the act to 
examine the effect of the JOBS Act on IPO cost.  The symmetric time window allows me 
to compare the magnitude of the change in the IPO cost over the pre-act and post-act 
period. And I hand collect data on IPOs voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds over the 
period from April 5, 2009 to April 5, 2015. Other variables are from CRSP database, 
Compustat and hand-collected information from the IPO’s S-1 prospectus.  
Methodology 
I apply both ordinary least square (OLS) regression method and difference-in-
difference (DID) regression method to analyze my sample. The drawback of OLS method 
is that OLS assumes there is a linear relationship between the interpreting factors and the 
result and it can only identify an association relationship between the interest independent 
variable (JOBS Act) and dependent variable (IPO cost).  To perform the OLS regression 
method, I only include the IPOs with less than or equal to $1 billion both in the pre-act 
and post-act period. Thus, I eliminate the IPOs with greater than $1 billion in the OLS 
method. For the IPOs that meet EGCs revenue requirement and issue new shares after 
                                                          
1 IPO prospectus can be found at SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) system and http://ipodatabase.net/database. 
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April 5, 2012, I code it as one for dummy EGCs. For the IPOs that meet EGCs revenue 
requirement but issue new shares before April 5, 2012, I code it as zero for dummy 
EGCs. I only include IPOs that meet EGCs status before and after the Act in the OLS 
method since those firms are more comparable in terms of firm size and other firm 
characteristics. The OLS method includes 429 IPOs in the final sample and 146 IPOs are 
from pre-Act period and 283 IPOs are from post-Act period.  
          I also apply difference-in-difference (DID) regression method to analyze my 
sample. The advantage of DID regression model is that it can identify a causal 
relationship between the policy (JOBS Act) and the related consequence (IPO cost) by 
comparing the treatment group with non-treatment group. My treatment group is the IPOs 
that meet the requirement for EGCs status (revenue less than or equal to $1 billion). Non-
treatment group is the IPOs that are not impacted by JOBS Act and thus have revenue 
greater than $1 billion. Treatment group includes 429 IPOs while the non-treatment 
group includes 63 IPOs. In total, the DID sample includes 492 IPOs.  I also standardize 
all the continuous independent variables in the model to avoid multicollinearity problem.2 
Measurement of IPO Direct Cost and Indirect Cost 
          Initial public offerings underpricing (IPO underpricing) is the dependent variable in 
my study. IPO underpricing is considered as the indirect cost of the IPO process. While 
the direct cost includes IPO registration, underwriting, attorney and auditing fees, the 
indirect cost, IPO underpricing, is a widely observed phenomenon. When firms initiate 
IPOs, the offer price set by investment banks is usually lower than the first day closing 
price. The difference is the IPO underpricing, which is considered as an incentive for 
                                                          
2 I standardize all the continuous variables in the equation 2 and 3, and equation 4 and 5. 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables in the model are all smaller than 5, which is an 
acceptance level for empirical research.   
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investors to bear the risks of buying the shares (Leone and Willenborg 2007). Equation 
(1) specifies the formula for IPO underpricing: 
IPO Underpricing= (first day closing price − offer price)/offer price   (1) 
To measure the IPO direct cost, I use the gross spread, which includes the cost 
ofissuance, accounting, legal or underwriting fee.  To scale the gross spread, I use 
principal amount raised from IPO to calculate gross spread percentage (Gross Spread %). 
Measurement of Voluntary Disclosure of Use-of-Proceeds in IPO 
          I specifically focus on IPO’s voluntary disclosure of plans for IPO proceeds in the 
prospectus. I divide the JOBS Act firms into high disclosure of use-of-proceeds group 
(JOBSHDis) and low disclosure of use-of-proceeds (JOBSHDis) group. To categorize 
this dummy variable, I hand collect IPO firm’s voluntary disclosure information from the 
prospectus. Specifically, I hand collect voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds amount 
for each usage. And then I calculate the fraction of use-of-proceeds. If the fraction of 
company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designed for specific use is greater than 
the sample mean, those JOBS Act firms are categorized as the high disclosure of use-of-
proceeds group and coded as one, ceteris paribus.  
Control Variables 
          Following the IPO underpricing literature, my control variables include firm 
characteristics variables and deal characteristics variables. Firm characteristics include 
firm age, exchange market where the IPOs are listed, and whether the firm belongs to 
high technology firms. Longer established firms have better available information and are 
expected to have lower IPO underpricing (Beatty and Ritter 1986). I include logarithm 
value of age (Lnage) in the model. IPO firms listed in NYSE and AMEX are considered 
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listing in the renowned stock exchange market, and tend to have lower IPO underpricing 
(Lowry et al. 2010). I include a dummy variable (NYSEAMEX) coded as one if the stock 
is listed in NYSE or AMEX. High technology firms are considered to have more 
information asymmetry and involve more risk. Thus high technology firms tend to have 
higher IPO underpricing. I include a dummy variable (Hightech) coded as one if the firm 
is considered to be a high technology firm. I include the logarithm value of firms’ asset 
before IPO (Lnat) as a control for firm size.   
          Deal characteristics include IPO proceeds, IPO underwriter bank rank, whether the 
firm’s offer price is an integer.  Prior research shows that the more proceeds that issuers 
raise at the IPO, the more underpricing the deals tend to be (Green and Hwang 2012).  
Bradley et al. (2004) report that IPOs with integer prices experience higher underpricing. 
They also suggest that underwriters’ bargain power of a finer offer price increases as the 
uncertainty surrounding firm value declines. Thus, for IPOs that are particularly difficult 
to value tend to have integer offer price. I include a dummy variable (Intpdummy) coded 
as one if the offer price is an integer. Prior literature finds that highly ranked underwriters 
tend to have lower underpricing, which is called the certification effect (Carter and 
Manaster 1990). However, recent literature finds that high rank of underwriters might 
have a positive relationship with IPO underpricing, which is called the reverse 
certification effect (Loughran and Ritter 2004).  I include a dummy variable 
(Topunderwriter) coded as one if the lead underwriter’s (Carter and Manster, 1990) rank 
is greater than or equal to eight. I also include a dummy variable (VC) if the issuing firm 
has venture capital banking (Barry et al. 1990).  I include a variable (Priceupdate) to 
indicate the percent change between the offer price and the average of the high and low 
14 
 
initial filing prices. I calculate it as IPO share price / mid-point of initial share price range 
as filed with SEC, and I expect that it has positive relation with the IPO underpricing. I 
include a dummy variable (Pureprimary) to indicate whether offerings consist of primary 
shares only, and I expect that it has positive relation with IPO underpricing. Ratio of 
retained shares to shares offered is controlled as Shareoverhang. Lastly, I include S&P 
500 Index change percentage two weeks prior to the IPO date (S&Pchange) to control the 
hot market effect. 
Descriptive Statistics 
          Table 1 panel A reports the sample selection procedure. My sample includes IPOs 
that are issued in United States from April 5, 2009 to April 5, 2015. During the period, 
1187 new firms were listed in the U.S. stock exchange.  I select only common/ ordinary 
shares IPOs, delete close-ends funds, real estate investment trust (REIT), right offers, unit 
offers, limited partnership banking industry, offering price lower than $2, and control 
variables financial data missing observations. My final sample includes 492 IPOs during 




















Table 1 Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
Sample selection procedure Number of observations 
Initial public offering--selection US IPO from SDC(04/05/2009-
04/05/2015) 1187 
Select common shares/ordinary shares 1044 
Delete close-ends funds 937 
Delete REIT (code/segment) 873 
Delete right offers 869 
Delete unit offers 869 
Delete limted partnership 868 
Merge with Jay Ritter age variable (9902 observations from 
1975-2015) 797 
Delete banking industry and offer price lower than $2 717 
Delete control variables financial data missing 225 
Final Sample 492 
 
Table 1 panel B reports sample distribution based on firm category and time 
category. In my sample, 165 IPOs in the pre-Act period are included while 327 IPOs in 
the post-Act period are included. In addition, 63 IPOs in the sample are considered as not 
affected by the JOBS Act and 429 IPOs in the sample are considered as affected by the 
JOBS Act.   
 
Table 1 Panel B: Sample distribution based on firm category and time category 
Category firm observations Pre-Act Post-Act Total  
   JOBS Not Affected 19 44 63 
   JOBS Affected 146 283 429 
   Total 165 327 492 
    
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 492 firms. In panel A 
of table 2, the average IPO underpricing is 16.5%. The average gross spread amount is 
$0.94 million and the average gross spread percent is 6.7%. The average proceeds that an 
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IPO raises are $167.24 million. The average asset of a firm before going public is $597.9 
million. Panel B table 2 compares the descriptive statistics for JOBS affected firms and 
JOBS not affected firms.  JOBS affected firms tend to have higher IPO indirect cost 
(underpricing) and lower direct cost (gross spread and gross spread %). JOBS affected 
firms are less likely to be listed on premium stock exchange, more likely to be high 
technology firms, more likely to be backed by venture capital and less likely to be 
underwritten by top investment banks. Also JOBS affected firms tend to raise smaller 
proceed and has smaller asset before offering.   
Table 2 Panel A: Descriptive statistics         
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
Underpricing 485 0.165 0.257 0.000 0.085 0.272 
Gross spread 485 0.940 0.323 0.700 0.910 1.120 
Gross spread percent 486 6.744 0.578 7.000 7.000 7.000 
Postact 492 0.665 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Jobs_affected 492 0.872 0.334 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Intpdummy 492 0.907 0.291 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NYSEAMEX 492 0.374 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Hightech 492 0.541 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
VC 492 0.551 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Priceupdate 492 0.972 0.145 0.867 1.000 1.071 
Proceed(million) 492 167.242 204.470 65.000 97.350 171.650 
Pureprimary 492 0.665 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Age 492 9.846 8.391 5.000 8.000 13.000 
Topunderwriter 492 0.657 0.475 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Spchange 492 0.559 2.198 -0.830 0.810 1.935 
Shareoverhang 492 90.478 17.369 85.200 100.000 100.000 













Variable Mean Mean Prob (1 equals 2) 
Underpricing 0.178 0.076 0.101*** 
Gross spread 0.929 1.019 0.09** 
Gross spread% 6.870 5.865 1.004*** 
Postact 0.660 0.698 0.039 
Intpdummy 0.902 0.937 0.034 
NYSEAMEX 0.324 0.714 0.390*** 
Hightech 0.594 0.175 0.42*** 
VC 0.620 0.079 0.541*** 
Priceupdate 0.975 0.951 0.024 
Proceed(million) 127.135 440.348 313.200*** 
Pureprimary 0.655 0.730 0.075 
Age 9.923 9.317 0.606 
Topunderwriter 0.634 0.810 0.176*** 
Spchange 0.604 0.256 0.348 
Shareoverhang 90.050 93.392 3.343* 
Asset(million) 241.938 3021.980 2780.000*** 
Note: Table 2 panel A reports the variables descriptive statistics based on 492 IPOs 
during the period April 5th, 2009- April 5th, 2015. Panel B reports the variables 
descriptive statistics based firm category during the period April 5th, 2009- April 5th, 
2015. Refer to Appendix A for variable descriptions. 
 
Table 3 presents correlations among the IPO indirect cost, direct cost proxies and 
related variables. Table 3 shows that the EGCs status is significantly positive related with 
IPO underpricing (coefficient=0.093). IPO indirect cost (underpricing) is significantly 
positive related with direct cost (gross spread and gross spread %). However, the 
percentage number of direct cost (gross spread %) is significantly negative correlated 
with the absolute value of direct cost (gross spread).  
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
                  Variables   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Underpricing 1 -                 
Gross spread 2 0.373 -                
Gross spread % 3 0.130 -0.077 -               
Postact 4 0.093 0.070 -0.039 -              
Jobs_affected 5 0.132 -0.093 0.576 -0.027 -             
Intpdummy 6 0.083 0.088 0.058 0.112 -0.039 -            
NYSEAMEX 7 0.008 0.210 -0.272 -0.047 -0.270 -0.026 -           
Hightech 8 0.075 -0.213 0.295 0.140 0.281 -0.002 -0.316 -          
VC 9 0.171 -0.080 0.406 0.016 0.363 0.089 -0.282 0.521 -         
Priceupdate 10 0.502 0.498 0.088 0.001 0.055 0.021 0.072 0.058 0.126 -        
Proceed(million) 11 0.019 0.297 -0.760 0.002 -0.512 -0.065 0.324 -0.248 -0.308 0.143 -       
Pureprimary 12 -0.087 -0.151 -0.025 0.307 -0.053 0.068 -0.145 0.131 0.060 -0.137 -0.065 -      
Age 13 0.016 -0.038 0.048 -0.178 0.024 -0.013 -0.040 -0.072 -0.067 -0.011 -0.040 -0.126 -     
Topunderwriter 14 0.154 0.319 -0.126 -0.178 -0.123 0.018 0.276 -0.023 0.095 0.215 0.238 -0.160 -0.057 -    
Spchange 15 0.009 -0.044 0.031 -0.085 0.053 -0.123 -0.081 0.056 -0.019 0.015 -0.061 -0.036 0.032 -0.063 -   
Shareoverhang 16 -0.038 -0.143 -0.028 0.339 -0.064 0.069 -0.123 0.123 0.121 -0.043 -0.078 0.773 -0.132 -0.132 -0.068 -  
Asset(million) 17 -0.111 0.072 -0.576 -0.023 -0.602 0.034 0.257 -0.255 -0.352 -0.053 0.529 -0.018 -0.006 0.165 -0.084 -0.020 - 
Note: Table 3 is the Pearson correlation coefficients for variables in the primary analysis. The correlations are based on 492 IPO firms during the 












4.  Empirical Analyses 
Testing the Effect of the JOBS Act on IPO Indirect Cost and Direct Cost 
          I first set up equation (2) to apply OLS regression method to examine the effect of 
the JOBS Act on IPO indirect and direct cost.  
Underpricing/Gross Spread/Gross spread%= β0+β1EGCs+β4Intpdummy+ 
β5NYSEAMEX+β6Hightech+β7Topauditor+β8VC+β9Priceupdate+β10Lnprcd+β11
Pureprimary+β12Lnage+β13Topunderwriter+β14S&Pchange+ β15Shareoverhang 
+ β16Lnat+ ε                                                                                                         (2)   
Underpricing is included in the model as dependent variable and is a proxy for 
IPO indirect cost. Gross spread and gross spread percentage are included in the model as 
dependent variable and are proxies for IPO direct cost. All the independent variables are 
defined in the appendix A. The primary variable of interest is the dummy variable EGCs 
status. In the OLS regression model, I only include IPOs that meet the requirement of 
being considered as EGC IPOs, that is, pre-IPO revenue less than or equal to $1 billion.  
EGCs is equal to one if the IPO go public after the effective date of the JOBS Act (April 
5, 2012), zero otherwise.  In table 4, column 1 shows that the EGCs have significantly 
higher underpricing compared with the control group which has similar firm 
characteristics but issues new shares before the JOBS Act (coefficient=0.368, t-
stat=2.33). In column 2 and column 3, the variable EGCs is negative but insignificant. 
This insignificance might be due to the small sample of the OLS regression method. In 
terms of control variables, I find that price update (priceupdate) is strongly positive 
associated with IPO underpricing, which is consistent with Leone and Willenborg (2007). 
Also, column 2 and column 3 indicate that price update (priceupdate) is significantly 
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positive associated with IPO direct cost (e.g., gross spread). Top underwriter 
(Topunderwriter) is significantly positive associated with IPO underpricing, which is 
consistent with Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) reverse certification argument. Asset (Lnat) 
is negatively associated with IPO underpricing, which is consistent with Leone and 

















Table 4: The JOBS Act, indirect cost and direct cost using OLS regression method 
 
 Underpricing Gross Spread Gross Spread% 
EGCs 0.368** -0.066 -0.157 
 (2.33) (-0.90) (-1.34) 
    
Intpdummy 0.045 0.366*** 0.072 
 (0.26) (6.80) (0.64) 
    
NYSEAMEX -0.033 0.035 -0.029 
 (-0.33) (0.28) (-0.28) 
    
Hightech -0.016 -0.242 -0.147** 
 (-0.15) (-1.09) (-2.44) 
    
VC 0.203 0.091 0.176 
 (1.34) (1.00) (1.28) 
    
Priceupdate 0.441*** 0.256*** 0.080*** 
 (9.42) (5.12) (6.89) 
    
Lnprcd 0.133 0.584*** -0.274** 
 (1.05) (4.59) (-2.59) 
    
Pureprimary -0.032 -0.014 0.025 
 (-0.17) (-0.10) (0.32) 
    
Lnage 0.043 -0.009 -0.000 
 (0.62) (-0.16) (-0.01) 
    
Topunderwriter 0.145*** 0.181 0.117 
 (2.77) (1.57) (1.45) 
    
S&Pchange -0.007 0.018 -0.035 
 (-0.15) (0.23) (-1.48) 
    
Shareoverhang -0.029 -0.093* -0.078*** 
 (-0.75) (-1.68) (-3.55) 
    
Lnat -0.116*** -0.025 -0.134 
 (-2.74) (-1.10) (-1.53) 
    
Industry/Year Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 426 429 425 




Note: Table 4 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of IPO indirect cost 
(underpricing) and direct cost (gross spread & gross spread%) on firms’ emerging growth 
company status. The IPO underpricing is the firm’s first day trading return. EGC is equal 
to one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company in its S-1 prospectus 
between April 5, 2012 and April 5, 2015. Industry fixed effect (Fama-French 12 
classifications) and year fixed effect are included in the models as indicated, but 
coefficients are not reported. All t-statistics are calculated with two-way clustered 
standard errors by industry and by year. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * separately refer to significance (two tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Refer to 
Appendix A for variable descriptions. 
 
 I also set up equation (3) to apply difference-in-difference method to examine the 
effect of the JOBS Act on IPO indirect cost and direct cost.  
Underpricing/Gross Spread/Gross Spread%=β0+ β1Postact+β2JOBS_Affected              
+β3Postact*JOBS+β4Intpdummy+β5NYSEAMEX+β6Hightech+β7Topauditor+β8
VC+ β9Priceupdate+β10Lnprcd+β11Pureprimary+β12Lnage+β13Topunderwriter+ 
β14S&Pchange+ β15Shareoverhang + β16Lnat+ ε                                                (3)  
           The dependent variables are IPO indirect cost (underpricing) and IPO direct cost 
(Gross Spread/Gross Spread %). All the independent variables are defined in the 
appendix A. To apply the difference-in-difference method, I include the time dummy 
(Postact), the treatment dummy (JOBS_Affected) and the interaction term between these 
two dummies (Postact*JOBS) in the model. The other controls are the same as equation 
2. In table 5, the primary variable of interest is the interaction term (Postact*JOBS). In 
column 1, the interaction term is significantly positive associated with IPO underpricing 
(coefficient=0.287, t-stat=1.77). This result indicates that the passage of the JOBS Act 
increases the IPO underpricing. The result is consistent with the H1, which argues that 
information asymmetry increases for the EGCs because of less rigid regulation and less 
23 
 
disclosure requirement. In column 2, the interaction term (Postact*JOBS) is significantly 
negative associated with IPO direct cost (Gross Spread). This result shows that the 
absolute value of total direct cost for an IPO decreases after the passage of the JOBS Act. 
However, in column 3, the interaction term is not significantly associated with gross 
spread percentage. This result shows that while the absolute value of direct cost for an 
IPO decreases after JOBS, the ratio of direct cost to the principal amount does not 
decrease. In conclusion, after the passage of the JOBS Act, information asymmetry for 
EGCs increases. Thus the indirect cost, IPO underpricing, increases. And the absolute 
value of direct cost decreases, which shows that the JOBS Act partially fulfills its original 
goal, that is, reduce the financing burden for EGCs.  The control variables’ signs and 













Table 5: The JOBS Act, indirect cost and direct cost using DID regression method 
 Underpricing Gross Spread Gross Spread% 
Postact -0.568*** 0.429* -0.262*** 
 (-3.58) (1.78) (-2.80) 
    
JOBS_Affected 0.181 0.808*** 0.702 
 (1.13) (3.22) (1.08) 
    
Postact* JOBS 0.287* -0.447** 0.095 
 (1.77) (-2.42) (1.12) 
    
Intpdummy 0.096 0.311*** 0.034 
 (0.64) (6.70) (0.32) 
    
NYSEAMEX -0.043 0.107 0.092 
 (-0.40) (0.83) (0.76) 
    
Hightech -0.097 -0.286 -0.131 
 (-0.88) (-1.67) (-1.40) 
    
VC 0.170 0.072 0.235*** 
 (1.19) (0.75) (8.02) 
    
Priceupdate 0.426*** 0.277*** 0.120*** 
 (7.64) (5.75) (3.55) 
    
Lnprcd 0.130 0.544*** -0.432*** 
 (1.01) (5.02) (-3.18) 
    
Pureprimary -0.053 -0.010 0.031 
 (-0.38) (-0.11) (0.43) 
    
Lnage 0.041 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.87) (0.03) (-0.17) 
    
Topunderwriter 0.126** 0.206** 0.140* 
 (2.38) (2.57) (1.79) 
    
S&Pchange -0.003 0.030 -0.028 
 (-0.07) (0.09) (-1.50) 
    
Shareoverhang -0.018 -0.092* -0.086*** 
 (-0.43) (-1.94) (-6.93) 
    
Lnat -0.105** -0.067 -0.079 
 (-2.10) (-1.15) (-0.82) 
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 Underpricing Gross Spread Gross Spread% 
Industry/Year Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 492 486 
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.487 0.565 
Note: Table 5 reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-difference regression of 
IPO indirect cost (underpricing) and direct cost (gross spread & gross spread%) on IPOs’ 
emerging growth company status. The IPO underpricing is the firm’s first day trading 
return. JOBS_affected is equal to one if an IPO is categorized as EGC based on the 
requirement that revenue is smaller than 1 billion, zero otherwise. Postact is dummy one 
if an IPO go public after April 5, 2012, zero otherwise. Industry fixed effect (Fama-
French 12 classifications) and year fixed effect are included in the models as indicated, 
but coefficients are not reported. All t-statistics are calculated with two-way clustered 
standard errors by industry and by year. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * separately refer to significance (two tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Refer to 
Appendix A for variable descriptions. 
 
Testing the Effect of the JOBS Act and Voluntary Disclosure on IPO Indirect Cost 
and Direct Cost 
I set up equation (4) to apply OLS regression method to examine whether the 
relation between the JOBS Act and IPO cost is impacted by IPO firms’ voluntary 
disclosure behavior.  
Underpricing/Gross Spread/Gross Spread%=β0+β1EGCs+β2HDis+ 
β3EGCs*HDis+β4Intpdummy+β5NYSEAMEX+β6Hightech+β7Topauditor+β8VC+
β9Priceupdate+β10Lnprcd+β11Pureprimary+β12Lnage+β13Topunderwriter+ 
β14S&Pchange+β15Shareoverhang + β16Lnat+ ε                                                 (4) 
The dependent variables in equation 4 are IPO indirect cost (underpricing) and 
direct cost (gross spread and gross spread %). All independent variables are defined in 
appendix A. To apply the OLS regression method, I include an interaction term 
(EGCs*HDis) between IPO’s EGCs status and IPO’s voluntary disclosure level of use-
of-proceeds. In table 6 column 1, the interaction term has an opposite sign with main 
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effect EGCs and is significantly negative associated with IPO underpricing. This result 
shows that high voluntary disclosure tends to mitigate the EGCs status’ effect on IPO 
underpricing. In other words, if the EGCs disclose more voluntary disclosure 
information, the IPO underpricing (indirect cost) tends to be lower. The result of 
voluntary disclosure’s effect on direct cost is not statistically significant in column 2 and 
column 3 in table 6. Thus, I do not find the effect of the JOBS Act on IPO direct cost is 





















Table 6: The JOBS Act and voluntary disclosure using OLS regression method 
 Underpricing Gross Spread Gross Spread% 
EGCs 0.227 -0.064 -0.154** 
 (1.10) (-0.34) (-2.35) 
    
HDis 0.083 -0.037 0.083*** 
 (1.14) (-0.32) (5.54) 
    
EGCs* HDis -0.161* -0.002 -0.005 
 (-1.77) (-0.01) (-0.04) 
    
Intpdummy 0.033 0.365*** 0.074 
 (0.20) (8.30) (0.61) 
    
NYSEAMEX -0.034 0.035 -0.029 
 (-0.34) (0.28) (-0.27) 
    
Hightech -0.024 -0.241 -0.149** 
 (-0.22) (-1.08) (-2.11) 
    
VC 0.203 0.091 0.177 
 (1.34) (0.98) (0.8) 
    
Priceupdate 0.443*** 0.257*** 0.078*** 
 (9.54) (5.03) (5.17) 
    
Lnprcd 0.131 0.583*** -0.271** 
 (0.73) (4.57) (-2.50) 
    
Pureprimary -0.020 -0.021 0.039 
 (-0.10) (-0.14) (0.56) 
    
Lnage 0.044 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.64) (-0.15) (-0.03) 
    
Topunderwriter 0.152*** 0.184 0.110 
 (3.96) (1.56) (1.35) 
    
S&Pchange -0.006 0.019 -0.037* 
 (-0.13) (1.01) (-1.85) 
    
Shareoverhang -0.037 -0.092 -0.081*** 
 (-0.87) (-1.47) (-4.53) 
    
Lnat -0.122*** -0.030 -0.124 
 (-5.41) (-0.56) (-1.62) 
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 Underpricing Gross Spread Gross Spread% 
Industry/Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 426 429 425 
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.497 0.312 
Note: Table 6 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of IPO indirect cost 
(underpricing) and direct cost (gross spread & gross spread%) on firms’ emerging growth 
company status and firms’ voluntary disclosure level. The IPO underpricing is the firm’s 
first day trading return. EGC is equal to one if a firm identify itself as an emerging 
growth company in its S-1 prospectus between April 5, 2012 and April 5, 2015. HDis is 
equal to one if the voluntary disclosed IPO proceeds usages are greater than the sample 
mean, zero otherwise.  
Industry fixed effect (Fama-French 12 classifications) and year fixed effect are included 
in the models as indicated, but coefficients are not reported. All t-statistics are calculated 
with two-way clustered standard errors by industry and by year. T-statistics are presented 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * separately refer to significance (two tailed) at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. Refer to Appendix A for variable descriptions. 
 
I set up equation 5 to apply the difference-in-difference method to examine 
whether the relation between the JOBS Act and IPO cost is impacted by IPO firms’ 
voluntary disclosure behavior. 
Underpricing/Gross Spread/Gross Spread% =β0+ β1Postact+β2JOBSHDis+ 
β3JOBSLDis+β4Post*JOBSHDis+β5Post*JOBSLDis+β6Intpdummy+β7NYSEAM
EX+β8Hightech+β9Topauditor+β10VC+β11Priceupdate+β12Lnprcd+β13Pureprim
ary+β14Lnage+β15Topunderwriter+ β16S&Pchange+ β17Shareoverhang + 
β18Lnat+ ε                                                                                                              (5) 
The dependent variables in equation 5 are IPO’s indirect cost (Underpricing) and 
direct cost (Gross Spread and Gross Spread %). The major interest variables are the 
interaction (Post*JOBSHDis) between time dummy and high voluntary disclosure level 
and the interaction term (Post*JOBSLDis) between time dummy and low voluntary 
disclosure level. In table 7 column 1, the interaction term between time dummy and low 
voluntary disclosure level is positively significant (coefficient=0.406, t-stat=4.65) while 
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the interaction term between time dummy and high level voluntary disclosure level is 
insignificant (coefficient=0.264, t-stat=1.46). These result show that low voluntary 
disclosure IPOs tend to have higher underpricing after the passage of the JOBS Act while 
high voluntary disclosure IPOs do not have this incremental effect. In other words, the 
additional information that high voluntary disclosure IPOs offer is supplemental and 
useful information for investors to understand the IPOs. Thus, the effect of the JOBS Act 
on IPO indirect cost is weaker if the IPOs disclose more voluntary information of use-of-
proceeds. In table 7 column 2, both the high voluntary disclosure level and low voluntary 
disclosure level interactions are significantly negative (coefficient=-0.456, t-stat=-2.44 
and coefficient=-4.1, t-stat=-2.17). These results show that both the high voluntary 
disclosure and low voluntary disclosure reduce EGCs’ direct cost absolute value (Gross 
Spread). However, I observe no effect of voluntary disclosure on IPO direct cost 
percentage. The control variables’ signs and significance levels are generally the same 
with previous results. In conclusion, the voluntary disclosure information of use-of-
proceeds is beneficial to reduce the information asymmetry in the EGCs’ IPO process 








Table 7: The JOBS Act and voluntary disclosure using DID regression method 
 Underpricing Gross Spread Gross Spread% 
Postact -0.563*** 0.432* -0.264*** 
 (-3.38) (1.80) (-2.78) 
    
JOBSHDis 0.179 0.788*** 0.734 
 (0.98) (2.98) (0.92) 
    
JOBSLDis 0.112 0.814*** 0.646 
 (0.99) (3.01) (0.58) 
    
Post*JOBSHDis 0.264 -0.456** 0.093 
 (1.46) (-2.44) (1.18) 
    
Post*JOBSLDis 0.406*** -0.410** 0.121 
 (4.65) (-2.17) (0.66) 
    
Intpdummy 0.086 0.307*** 0.033 
 (0.60) (7.97) (0.27) 
    
NYSEAMEX -0.043 0.108 0.092 
 (-0.40) (0.84) (0.75) 
    
Hightech -0.104 -0.287* -0.133 
 (-0.96) (-1.68) (-1.31) 
    
VC 0.171 0.072 0.235*** 
 (1.19) (0.74) (8.94) 
    
Priceupdate 0.427*** 0.278*** 0.119*** 
 (7.80) (5.76) (3.37) 
    
Lnprcd 0.128 0.542*** -0.429*** 
 (1.1) (5.01) (-3.13) 
    
Pureprimary -0.046 -0.015 0.044 
 (-0.31) (-0.15) (0.65) 
    
Lnage 0.041 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.88) (0.04) (-0.20) 
    
Topunderwriter 0.133*** 0.211** 0.136* 
 (3.10) (2.57) (1.79) 
    
S&Pchange -0.003 0.031 -0.029* 
 (-0.06) (0.45) (-1.87) 
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 Underpricing Gross Spread Gross Spread% 
Shareoverhang -0.024 -0.092* -0.088 
 (-0.52) (-1.76) (-0.63) 
    
Lnat -0.109*** -0.073 -0.073 
 (-2.68) (-1.33) (-0.79) 
    
Industry/Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 492 486 
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.485 0.564 
Note: Table 7 reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-difference regression of 
IPO indirect cost (underpricing) and direct cost (gross spread & gross spread%) on firms’ 
emerging growth company status and firms’ voluntary disclosure level. The IPO 
underpricing is the firm’s first day trading return. Postact is equal to dummy one if an 
IPO go public after April 5, 2012, zero otherwise. JOBSHDis is equal to one if the firm 
has revenue below the 1 billion revenue cutoff point and the voluntary disclosed IPO 
proceeds usages are greater than the sample mean, and zero otherwise. JOBSLDis is 
equal to one if the firm has revenue above the 1 billion revenue cutoff point and the 
voluntary disclosed IPO proceeds usages are smaller than the sample mean, and zero 
otherwise. Industry fixed effect (Fama-French 12 classifications) and year fixed effect are 
included in the models as indicated, but coefficients are not reported. All t-statistics are 
calculated with two-way clustered standard errors by industry and by year. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * separately refer to significance (two tailed) at the 




5.  Additional Tests 
The main results are robust to a wide range of alternative specifications.  First, 
following Leone and Willenborg. (2007), I alternatively measure the voluntary disclosure 
of use-of-proceeds by defining a group as high disclosure group (dummy=1) that 
discloses dollar detail for “any” of the proceeds and defining a group as a low disclosure 
group (dummy=0) that does not do so. My H2 results still hold.  
Second, the main result still holds when I use different industry classifications.  I 
classify the sample by Fama-French 38 industries, 48 industries, SIC two digit industry 
classifications, SIC three digit industry classifications. The results are similar with my 
main results.  
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Third, to avoid the potential omitted correlated problem, I further control more 
factors that might impact IPO’s indirect cost and direct cost. I add the number of IPOs 
that issue new shares in the same year to further control the hot market effect. Since this 
study’s sample period overlaps the most recent 2008 financial crisis, I add financial crisis 
related variable to control for macroeconomic condition following Lang and Maffett 
(2011). Crisis dummy is equal to one if the equity market has a downturn in the prior 
month greater than 1.5 standard deviations below its historical average, zero otherwise.3 I 
also add other control variables such as firm’s book to market ratio before offering and 
IPO’s auditor reputation following prior studies (Leone and Willenborg 2007 and Betty 
1989). The main results still hold after I include these additional controls.  
Fourth, I add additional sample selection requirements. Specifically, I (1) truncate 
the sample at the top and bottom 3% levels for all continuous firm-level variables; (2) use 
SIC code from 6000-6999 to refer to banking industries, and I delete this broadly defined 
banking industry in the sample. The results remain qualitatively the same. I also restrict 
sample period within two years before and two years after the passage of the JOBS Act. 
The results about the JOBS Act on IPO indirect cost and direct cost remain qualitatively 
unchanged.  
6.  Conclusion 
This study investigates whether the adoption of the JOBS Act passed on April 5, 
2012 changes the indirect cost and direct cost of IPOs. Using both OLS regression 
method and difference-in-difference method on a sample of 492 IPOs during a symmetric 
                                                          
3 CRSP data used to calculate crisis dummy is not as current as SDC database 
observation. While I can include all the IPO observations from April 5 2009 to April 5 2012, I 
cannot include the related CRSP information to calculate the macroeconomic condition in 2015 
because of lack of 2015 CRSP information up to the draft is formed.   
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sample period from April 5, 2009 to April 5, 2015, I find evidence that the JOBS Act 
significantly increases the IPO’s indirect cost (underpricing) and decreases IPO’s 
absolute value of direct cost (gross spread). Further, IPOs which disclose more voluntary 
disclosure of proceeds usage experience the larger indirect cost increase and larger direct 
cost decrease.  
These results suggest that EGC firms enjoy lower direct financing cost after the 
JOBS Act because of less disclosure requirement and regulation requirement. However, 
the hidden indirect cost for IPOs increases significantly after the JOBS Act. These results 
are consistent with current academics’ concerns that the reduction of regulation for EGCs 
might lead to unintended consequences.  Taken together, my findings imply that the 
policymaker and regulators’ purpose in enacting the JOBS Act is at least partially 
satisfied. However, the information asymmetry for those EGCs also increases because of 
less vigorous regulation. My research contributes to the literature on documenting the 
empirical evidence of benefit and cost of the JOBS Act. It sheds new lights on the role of 
voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds usage in the EGCs’ IPO process.   
This study is limited by sample selection process. The JOBS Act defines EGCs’ 
criteria so broadly (revenue less than or equal to 1 billion) that 87.2% IPOs in the sample 
are categorized as JOBS affected group. The insufficient IPO observations in the non-
treatment group may bias my final results.  Future research can focus on the post-IPO 










UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE JOBS ACT OF 2012 AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON IPO FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND VALUE RELEVANCE 
1.  Introduction 
 
Private companies often go public for a variety of reasons with one overriding 
objective of gaining access to public markets in order to raise capital through Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs). The role of policymakers and regulators in the financial markets 
as pertains to IPOs has also evolved in protecting investors while promoting emerging 
growth companies (EGCs) to go public in creating more jobs in the aftermath of the 2007 
financial crisis.  The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act) was enacted in 
April 5, 2012 to enable EGCs to go public without being subject to full vigorous range of 
regulations applicable to publicly traded companies. The JOBS Act by relaxing 
disclosure requirements may loosen investor protections in favor of creating more jobs. 
Some provisions of the JOBS Act such as the increase in the shareholder limit from 500 
to 2,000 to be exempt from registration requirements under the ’34 Act went into effect 
immediately and thus do not require SEC further rulemaking. However, EGCs are 
required the same level of scrutiny from the SEC staff and their registration statements on 
risk disclosures are the same for all companies required to file an IPO registration 
statement with the SEC. 
The main concerns of the JOBS Act are that its relaxation of IPO requirements 
may be detrimental to investors and the capital markets by: (1) reducing transparency and 
investor protection; (2) making securities law enforcement more difficult which may 
reduce capital markets safety and soundness; and (3) reducing publicly available 
information by exempting EGCs from currently mandated certain disclosure and other 
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requirements.  These concerns are also raised by the investment community, institutional 
investors and regulators. Lynn Turner, the former SEC chief accountant in testifying 
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, on March 16, 
2012, states the following regarding the JOBS Act “I find it reduces the level of 
transparency and amount of information investors will receive. It removes critical 
investor protections put in place to protect against a repeat of past scandals. It decreases 
the credibility of the information one will receive…This legislation is currently 
unbalanced and likely to result in more unsuccessful investments for investors” (Turner, 
2012). Colorado PERA states that “The JOBS Act will roll back important investor 
protections and will actually weaken market transparency and erode the public’s faith in a 
market that appears to be on the cusp of recover (Colorado PERA, 2012). Luis A. 
Aguilar, the SEC Commissioner voices his concerns about the JOBS Act by stating that 
“This bill seems to impose tremendous costs and potential harm on investors with little to 
no corresponding benefit” (Aguilar, 2012). On one hand, the JOBS Act tries to ease the 
process for the small firms to get access to capital. On the other hand, regulators have 
concerns about whether these reduced regulations may bring detrimental effect to the 
investors. This study addresses these concerns about unintended consequences of the 
JOBS Act by investigating its impacts on EGCs’ financial performance, Tobin’s Q and 
value relevance.  Theoretical studies (Healy and Palepu 2001; Leuz and Wysocki 2007) 
provide support for the proposition that higher disclosure quality reduces investors’ 
uncertainty about the firm’s sustainable profitability and in turn improves performance. 
Prior empirical studies (Frankel, McNichols and Wilson 1995; Healy, Hutton and Palepu 
1999; and Lang and Lundholm 2000) find evidence of a positive association between 
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quality of financial disclosures and external capital raising activities. In the JOBS Act 
setting, loosened regulations entice those small firms to go public without rigorous 
scrutiny. With strong regulations, these small firms might not be eligible to issue new 
shares because of the lack of strong operation profitability. Thus, those EGCs might have 
weaker financial performance due to the weak operation profitability.  
In this study, I examine EGCs’ financial performance compared with non-EGCs. I 
use three measurements to proxy firms’ financial performance. They are firms’ return on 
asset, return on equity and quarterly return. And I find that EGCs in general tend to have 
lower financial performance than the non-EGCs. Also, Tobin’s Q is an important 
indicator illustrating the firms’ market valuation in finance and accounting literature. By 
comparing Tobin’s Q of EGCs and non-EGCs, I find that EGCs tend to have higher 
Tobin’s Q ratio, and thus tend to be overvalued by investors. Lastly, by employing two 
value relevance models, price model and stock return model following Ali and Hwang 
(2000), I find that accounting information value relevance for EGCs tends to be lower 
than non-EGCs. My sample includes 3 years period after the passage of the JOBS Act. 
Specifically, it covers the period from the passing date of the JOBS Act in April 5, 2012 
to April 5, 2015. The final sample includes 458 IPOs.  
My study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the JOBS Act’s 
consequences. By comprehensively examining EGCs’ financial performance, Tobin’s Q, 
and value relevance, this study documents evidence for regulators, policymakers and 
investors about the performance of those EGCs. In addition, this study is informative for 
the small firms who consider issuing new shares as EGCs status.  
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Section 2 surveys the related literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 
shows the variable measurements, sample and descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes 
empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2.  Institutional Background and Literature Review 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act) 
President Obama, On April 5, 2012, signed into law the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (the JOBS Act). The JOBS Act is intended to enable public companies to 
raise capital and private companies to go public by reducing the regulatory burdens of 
capital raising and ongoing SEC reporting. The JOBS Act enables substantial relaxation 
and loosening of restrictions around the traditional IPO process and post-IPO reporting 
requirements. It loosens investor protections with the goal of creating more jobs by 
reducing disclosure requirements for so-called emerging growth companies (EGCs) that 
decide to go public and have up to $1 billion in annual revenue. The JOBS Act presents 
several implications for private company mergers and acquisitions and may promote and 
affect the RM process. The JOBS Act also enables emerging growth companies or 
“EGCs” to file their registration statements confidentially so long as the confidential 
filings are ultimately released at least 21 days before the IPO. It is expected that EGCs 
will take advantages of keeping early filings confidential in order to pull their deal 
without the stigma associated with withdrawing a publicly filed registration statement 
and keep the IPO process outside the public eye and invisible to prospective acquirers. 
The JOBS Act provides the opportunity for EGCs to undertake a dual-track process 
instead of the traditional standalone M&A process to comply with a more relaxed 
restrictions on “test the waters” pre-marketing of the conventional IPO process.  
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  The JOBS Act encourages private EGCs with annual gross revenues of less than 
$1 billion to either go public or merge with existing public companies. The JOBS Act has 
significantly changed the process for IPOs by EGCs in several ways including:  
1. Enabling EGCs and their authorized representatives to test the waters with 
institutional accredited investors (IAIs) and qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) 
by gauging their interest prior to (and after) filing a registration statement for any 
securities offering.   
2. Allowing broker-dealers to issue research reports on EGCs before, during or after 
IPOs regardless of whether the broker-dealer is participating in the offering. 
3.  Permitting research analysts to communicate with investors and management in 
connection with the IPO of EGCs.  
4. Allowing EGCs to submit draft IPO registration statements to the SEC for 
confidential review prior to filing them publicly.  
5. Excluding EGCs from compliance with Section 404(b) of SOX which requires the 
auditors of a public company to attest to and report on the company’s internal 
control over financial reporting. 
6. Directing the SEC to decide whether any new rules that may be adopted by the 
PCAOB requiring mandatory audit firm rotation or changes to the auditor’s report 
and any other future rules adopted by the PCAOB be applicable to audits of 
EGCs.  
7. Allowing EGCs to present no more than two years of audited financial statements 
in its IPO registration statement as opposed to the current rules requiring three 
years of audited income statements, and five years of selected financial data. 
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8. Permitting EGCs  not to present selected financial data pursuant to Item 301 of 
Regulation S-K (or, apparently, financial statements in any other registration 
statement) for any period prior to the earliest audited period presented in 
connection with their  IPOs. 
9. Exempting EGCs from compliance with executive compensation-related 
disclosure provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 including those pertaining to 
the advisory “say-on-pay” vote on executive compensation required under Section 
14A(a) of the Exchange Act; the Section 14A(b) requirements relating to 
shareholder advisory votes on golden parachute compensation; the Section 14(i) 
requirements for disclosure relating to the relationship between executive 
compensation and financial performance of the issuer; and the requirement of 
Dodd-Frank Act Section 953(b)(1), which will require disclosure as to the 
relationship between CEO and median employee pay. 
10. Exempting EGCs from complying with any new or revised financial accounting 
standards. 
11. Increase the number of record holders a company may have up to 2,000 from 
currently required 500, before it is required to publish annual and quarterly 
reports 
12. Permitting EGCs to offer and sale unlimited securities under Rule 506 of 
Regulation D. 
In summary, the JOBS Act directs the SEC to amend Rule 506 of Regulation D and 
Rule 144A under the Securities Act to eliminate the prohibition on general solicitation in 
transactions effected under those rules. Thus, it is expected to ease requirements for IPOs 
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and reduce compliance and reporting obligations in the post-IPOs for EGCs. The main 
concerns of the JOBS Act are that its relaxation of IPO requirements may be detrimental 
to investors and the capital markets by: (1) reducing transparency and investor protection;   
(2) making securities law enforcement more difficult which may reduce capital markets 
safety and soundness; and (3) reducing publicly available information by exempting 
EGCs from currently mandated certain disclosure and other requirements.  
Prior Research 
My analysis of the unintended consequences of the JOBS Act is motivated by two 
streams of research as explained in details in this section. First, Gao, Ritter and Zhu 
(2012) document that during 1980-2000, an average of 165 companies with less than $50 
million in annual sales went public each year, whereas recently  in 2001-2011 period  the 
average has fallen by more than 80%, to only 29 small firm IPOs per year. Gao et al. 
(2012) also find that several factors, including a drop in public market valuations of tech 
companies, high compliance cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, a drop in 
analyst coverage of small companies and the declining profitability of small companies 
have contributed to the decreasing trend in IPO by small companies in the U.S. in the past 
decade. Prior research (Adjei, Cyree and Walker 2008) finds that private companies using 
the RM technique: (1) are smaller, younger, and have poorer ex ante performance on 
average than those using IPOs; (2) 1.4% do not meet any listing requirements whereas all 
IPOs meet at least one requirement of the listing standards and; (3) forty-two percent of 
RMs are delisted compared with 27% of matched IPOs within 3 years of listing on an 
exchange. Carpentier, Cumming and Suret (2010) find that the choice of the listing 
method (RM, or IPO) and regulation strictness significantly influence the value and long-
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run performance of newly listed firms. Several prior studies examine the link between 
regulation and the success/failure of IPOs, and they generally support the conjecture that 
tougher and robust regulation reduces the IPOs failure rate. Klein and Mohanram (2005) 
investigate non-financial IPOs on NASDAQ when (1997 through 2000) companies could 
list in compliance with a minimum pre-tax earnings (relaxed IPO requirements) standard 
and report that failure rates were significantly higher during that period. Carpentier and 
Suret (2011) find that among “small cap” Canadian IPOs executed between 1986 and 
2003 the failure rate was lower for those companies that had to meet tougher and robust 
stock exchange listing requirements. Gerakos, Lang and Maffett (2011) document that 
IPO failure rates on UK’s AIM (perceived as relaxed regulatory standards) are 
significantly higher than failure rates on more vigorous and robust regulated US stock 
markets. Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2009), however, find only insignificant 
between IPO failure rates of AIM and US stock exchanges. Chambers (2010) analyzes 
IPOs on the interwar London market and reports that following the failure of numerous 
IPOs floated in the late 1920s the adoption of tougher regulation by the LSE coincided 
with a dramatic improvement in the survival rate.  
The second stream of research is in the area of the association between financial 
disclosures firm value and investor protection as the looser rules allowed under the JOBS 
Act have raised concerns of possible negative impacts on investor protections. Market-
wide effects of the JOBS Act are also important if net cost of EGC IPOs at firm level 
affects the entire market or the net cost is ignored or not fully internalized by EGCs (Leuz 
et al. 2008).  Market-wide effects of looser rules under the JOBS Act that may result in 
less transparent financial disclosures can be measured in terms of impacts on cost of 
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capital, liquidity and firm valuation (Leuz et al. 2008). Implementation of looser rules of 
the JOBS Act by EGCs can affect cost of capital through firm risk estimation (e.g., Leuz 
et al. 2008; Barry and Brown 1984). Estimation of risk can be affected because 
parameters such as a firm beta factor must be estimated based on historical stock returns. 
EGCs with less transparent financial disclosures and looser IPO rules may exhibit higher 
betas and expected returns than those conventional IPOs with a more rigorous reporting 
disclosure environment. Furthermore, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003), Hughes et al 
(2007), and Lambert et al (2007a, b) provide evidence that the quality of the firm’s 
disclosures increases its cost of capital. Following this line of research, I posit that any 
decreases in the quality and quantity of EGCs’ financial disclosures may adversely affect 
financial performance, market performance and value relevance. 
Hypothesis Development 
Prior research as stated in the previous section suggests that the enactment of the 
U.S. Securities Act of 1933 prompted a reduction in the variance of stock returns of 
public companies and deterred riskier ventures from going public which resulted in the 
survival rate of IPOs. Prior studies in agency theory (e.g., Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002; 
Lambert et al. 2007a) find that more transparency and better corporate governance lower 
cost of capital and thus increase firm value through improving managerial investment and 
production decisions or by reducing the amount that managers appropriate for themselves. 
Prior studies find evidence that suggests high quality financial reports and voluntary 
disclosures reduce cost of capital. EGCs may choose to take advantage of less vigorous 
requirements by applying the JOBS Act (e.g., filing offering documents confidentially to 
the SEC, providing less transparent information on their internal control effectiveness and 
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executive-pay plans and the opportunity of the early assessment of investors' interest in a 
stock offering). In this study setting, EGCs disclose less information, thus is less 
transparent. More importantly, those EGCs might not be eligible to issue new shares 
under a more vigorous regulation. This might due to the innate fact that EGCs have 
weaker operation profitability to support their development than non-EGCs. Therefore, I 
propose that EGCs’ financial performance tend to be lower than non-EGCs. Combining 
with my previous arguments, I propose my H1a as: 
H1a: Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) that comply with loosened 
rules of the JOBS Act exhibit lower financial performance. 
Tobin’s Q ratio, developed by Nobel laureate James Tobin, is an important 
proxy that illustrates whether the firm is overvalued or undervalued. A high 
Tobin’s Q ratio represents that the firm’s market value is overvalued. For EGCs, 
less vigorous regulation gives them easier access to raise capital. However, their 
accounting basics might not be strong enough to support high market value priced 
by the less informed investors. Thus, compared with non-EGCs which have 
stronger operation condition to support their financial performance, EGCs are 
more likely to be overvalued based on Tobin’s Q measurement. Therefore, I 
propose my H1b as: 
H1b: Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) that comply with loosened 
rules of the JOBS Act exhibit higher Tobin’s Q. 
Lastly, after the JOBS Act, EGCs are eligible to disclose less information 
in their IPO prospectus. For example, they are eligible to disclose reduced years 
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(2 years) financial information in the prospectus, while current rule requires firms 
to disclose 5 years of financial information. Also, EGCs are exempt from 
compliance with executive compensation-related disclosure. Because of the lack 
of transparency, accounting basic information might have less predictive power 
for the market performance since investors rely less on opaque firms. Therefore, I 
propose that the value relevance of EGCs tends to be lower than non-EGCs. Thus, 
I conclude my H2 as: 
H2: The value relevance of the accounting information is lower for 
Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs). 
3.  Sample 
Based on SEC’s requirement that a company identify itself as an emerging growth 
company should disclose its status on the cover page of its prospectus, I use a textual 
search keyword “Emerging Growth” or “EGC” to identify the issuers opting to be a 
EGCs.1 The cutoff date for IPOs to claim their EGCs status is April 5, 2012. My sample 
includes IPOs that are issued in United States from April 5 2012 to April 5 2015. During 
the period, 732 new firms were listed in the U.S. stock exchange.  I select only common/ 
ordinary shares IPOs, delete close-ends funds, real estate investment trust (REIT), right 
offers, unit offers, limited partnership banking industry, offering price lower than $2, and 
delete control variables which financial data is missing. My final sample includes 458 
IPOs in the United States during the sample period. My main results only include firm-
quarter data in the post-IPO period. Robustness check results include firm-quarter data 
both in the pre-IPO period and post-IPO period.  
                                                          
1 IPO prospectus can be found at SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval 




Table 8 lists my sample selection requirement. My final sample includes 458 
IPOs issued between the periods from April 5 2012 to April 5 2015. My empirical 
analyses use firm-quarter data and 2405 firm-quarter observations are used in the main 
analyses.   
 
Table 8: Sample selection procedure  
Sample selection procedure Number of 
observations 
Initial public offering--selection US IPO from SDC(04/05/2012-
04/05/2015) 
732 
Select common shares/ordinary shares 643 
Delete close-ends funds 587 
Delete REIT (code/segment) 556 
Delete right offers 552 
Delete unit offers 551 
Delete limited partnership 868 
Delete banking industry and offer price lower than $2 and control 
variables financial data missing 
458 
Final Sample 458 
Note: Table 8 lists the sample selection procedure. Sample covers the period from April 




Table 9 lists the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 458 firms. In panel A 
of table 9, the average ROA for all firms is -0.042. The average ROE for all firms is -
0.015. The average return for all firms is 0.042.  And the average Tobin’s Q for all firms 
is 3.401. Panel B table 9 compares the descriptive statistics for EGCs and non-EGCs.  
EGCs tend to have lower ROA (difference=0.054), and the average difference is 
significant at the 1% level. EGCs tend to have lower ROE (difference=0.024), and the 
average difference is significant at 1% level.  EGCs tend to have lower return 
(difference=0.021), but insignificant. Finally, EGCs tend to have higher Tobin’s Q 
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(difference=1.15), and the average difference is significant at 1% level. In general, table 9 
shows that EGCs tend to have lower financial performance than the non-EGCs.   
 
 
Table 9 Panel A: Descriptive  statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
ROA 2405 -0.042 0.091 -0.072 -0.006 0.010 
ROE 2369 -0.015 0.046 -0.024 -0.004 0.009 
EGCs 2405 0.775 0.418 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Return 2034 0.042 0.291 -0.128 0.016 0.169 
Tobin's Q 2127 3.401 2.723 1.570 2.611 4.231 
Price 2380 20.993 15.478 9.725 17.595 28.245 
Size(million) 2405 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Leverage 2405 0.163 0.215 0.000 0.049 0.289 
MB 2405 4.598 8.707 1.794 3.573 6.128 
BVPS 2370 5.672 5.023 2.342 4.251 7.608 
EPS 2365 -0.091 0.432 -0.340 -0.060 0.180 
Loss 2405 0.562 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Table 9 Panel A lists the variables descriptive statistics during the period April 5, 























Table 9 Panel B: Descriptive statistics by firm category 
 1. Non EGCs (N=68 
firms) 
2. EGCs (N=391 
firms) 
Comparison 
 Mean Mean Prob (1 equals 2) 
ROA 0.000 -0.054 -0.054*** 
ROE 0.004 -0.020 -0.024*** 
Return 0.058 0.037 -0.021 
Tobin's Q 2.445 3.595 1.150*** 
Price 27.370 19.135 -8.235*** 
Size(million) 0.003 0.001 -0.002*** 
Leverage 0.328 0.115 -0.213*** 
MB 3.023 5.056 2.033*** 
BVPS 7.552 5.138 -2.414*** 
EPS 0.173 -0.168 -0.341*** 
Loss 0.264 0.648 0.025*** 
Note: Table 9 Panel B lists the variables descriptive statistics for EGCs and non-EGCs 
during the period April 5, 2012 to April 5, 2015 within United States.  
 
 
Table 10 lists the correlation matrix among the EGCs, firms’ financial 
performance and other control variables. In table 10, EGCs dummy is significantly 
negative correlated with ROA and ROE. EGCs dummy is also negatively correlated with 




Table 10: Correlation matrix 
Variables   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ROA 1 -            
ROE 2 0.638 -           
EGCs 3 -0.249 -0.214 -          
Return 4 0.050 0.173 -0.031 -         
Tobin’s Q 5 -0.358 0.001 0.158 0.290 -        
Price 6 0.285 0.321 -0.222 0.233 0.342 -       
Size 7 0.235 0.229 -0.410 0.092 0.161 0.596 -      
Leverage 8 0.199 0.102 -0.414 -0.013 -0.318 0.023 0.279 -     
MB 9 -0.097 0.041 0.098 0.166 0.448 0.208 0.157 -0.211 -    
BVPS 10 0.359 0.298 -0.199 0.019 -0.309 0.286 0.150 0.050 -0.100 -   
EPS 11 0.580 0.593 -0.330 -0.017 -0.243 0.147 0.173 0.198 -0.124 0.286 -  
Loss 12 -0.568 -0.531 0.324 -0.018 0.266 -0.220 -0.195 -0.211 0.105 -0.367 -0.734 - 
Note: Table 10 lists the correlation matrix among variables used in the equations 1,2,3,4.
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4.  Empirical Analyses 
Financial Performance of EGCs and non-EGCs  
Following previous literature, I focus on studying three measurements of firm 
financial performance of EGCs. Especially, the three measurements of firm performance 
include return on asset (ROAi,t), return on equity (ROEi,t), and quarterly stock 
return(Returni,t). Therefore, I establish equation (1) to test my first hypothesis: 
Performance(ROAi,t/ROEi,t/Returni,t)=β0+β1EGCs+β2Sizei,t+β3Leveragei,t+ 
β4MBi,t +INDUSTRYi,t +εi,t        (1) 
Where: 
ROAi,t=Calculated as quarterly income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets for firm i at quarter t; 
ROEi,t=Calculated as quarterly income before extraordinary items divided by 
market value of equity for firm i at quarter t; 
Returni,t=Calculated as quarterly price change percentage; 
EGCs=Dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company in its 
S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise;  
Sizei,t=The natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalization for firm i at quarter 
t;  
Leveragei,t=Financial leverage, calculated as long-term debt scaled by total 
assets for firm i at quarter t; 
MBi,t= Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity scaled by book 
value of equity for firm i at quarter t; 




The dependent variable in equation 1 is firm’s financial performance. My interest 
variable is firms’ EGCs status.  Table 11 panel A lists equation 1’s result with only 
observations in the post-IPO period. Column 1 and column 2 show that EGCs status is 
significantly negative associated with lower firm’s performance ROA (coefficient=-0.011, 
t-stat=-2.01) and ROE (coefficient=-0.014, t-stat=-4.96). In column 3, EGCs is 
negatively associated with firm’s quarterly return, but insignificant. The general 
significantly negative association between EGCs status and firm’s financial performance 
supports that EGCs tend to have lower financial performance. As for the control 
variables, firm size is significantly positive associated with firm financial performance, 
showing that big firms tend to perform better in terms of financial performance measured 
by ROA/ROE/Return. Firms’ growth opportunity (measured as MB ratio) is in general 
significantly positive associated with firms’ financial performance (ROE/Return).  Highly 
leverage firms tend to have lower financial performance. Table 11 panel B lists equation 
1’ result with observations in the pre-IPO period and post-IPO period. Most of the IPO 
firms publish two years pre-IPO information, so adding observations from pre-IPO 
periods can be my robustness check for panel A’s result. Table 11 panel B’s result is 
similar with panel A’s result after I include pre-IPO financial performance observations 
in the model. Specifically, EGCs status is significantly negative associated with 
ROA/ROE. Control variables’ results remain qualitatively the same with panel A. In 
general, both panel A and panel B’s results show that EGCs tend to have lower financial 
performance compared with non-EGCs. In conclusion, these results supports my H1a that 
EGCs have lower financial performance compared with non-EGCs. 
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Table 11 Panel A: Firm performance comparison between EGCs and non-EGCs 
 Return on Asset Return on Equity Quarterly Return 
EGCs -0.011** -0.014*** -0.021 
 (-2.01) (-4.96) (-0.97) 
    
Size 0.054*** 0.03*** 0.1*** 
 (6.28) (7.87) (3.14) 
    
Leverage -0.013 -0.021** 0.018 
 (-1.29) (-2.52) (0.45) 
    
MB -0.000 0.000*** 0.005*** 
 (-0.92) (3.29) (5.07) 
    
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2405 2403 2062 
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.187 0.034 
Note: Table 11 Panel A reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of financial 
performance (Return on Asset, Return on Equity and Quarterly Return) on EGCs status. 
Panel A only includes post-IPO firm-quarter observations. My interest independent 
variable is EGCs status. EGCs is Dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging 
growth company in its S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise. Industry classifications reflect 
Fama-French 48. T-statistics are presented in parentheses and are calculated using 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. ***, ** and * separately refer to 





















Table 11 Panel B: Firm performance comparison between EGCs and non-EGCs 
with pre-IPO financial information 
 Return on Asset Return on Equity Quarterly Return 
EGCs -0.037*** -0.015*** -0.025 
 (-3.06) (-5.17) (-1.18) 
    
Size 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 
 (2.64) (7.91) (3.30) 
    
Leverage -0.066* -0.019** 0.010 
 (-1.70) (-2.48) (0.32) 
    
MB 0.001 0.000*** 0.005*** 
 (0.61) (3.26) (5.05) 
    
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2452 2419 2079 
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.188 0.036 
Note: Table 11 Panel B reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of financial 
performance (Return on Asset, Return on Equity and Quarterly Return) on EGCs status. 
Panel B includes both pre-IPO and post-IPO firm-quarter observations. My interest 
independent variable is EGCs status. EGCs is Dummy one if a firm identify itself as an 
emerging growth company in its S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise. Industry classifications 
reflect Fama-French 48. T-statistics are presented in parentheses and are calculated using 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. ***, ** and * separately refer to 





4.2 Tobin’s Q of EGCs and non-EGCs 
Tobin’s Q is another common proxy of corporate valuation since it measures the 
overall market valuation of asset over book value of asset. A high Tobin’s Q value 
indicates that the firm is more likely being overvalued, and a low Tobin’s Q value 
indicates that the firm is more likely being undervalued.  




Tobin’s Qi,t = Calculated as market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets (Kaplan and Zingales 1997; Bebchuk and Cohen 2005) for firm i at quarter 
t; 
EGCs= Dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company in its 
S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise;  
Sizei,t= The natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalization for firm i at quarter 
t; 
Leveragei,t= Financial leverage, calculated as long-term debt scaled by total 
assets for firm i at quarter t; 
MBi,t= Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity scaled by book 
value of equity for firm i at quarter t; 
INDUSTRYi,t  =  Fama-French 48 industry classification for firm i;  
 
 Table 12 lists the result for equation 2. Column 1 includes only the observations 
from post-IPO period. In column 1, EGCs is significantly positive associated with 
Tobin’s Q, suggesting that EGCs tend to be overvalued (coefficient=0.764, t-stat=3.01). 
Column 3 includes observations both from pre-IPO period and post-IPO period.  Similar 
result is found about EGCs’ effect on Tobin’s Q. Specifically, EGCs is significantly 
positive associated with Tobin’s Q (coefficient=0.851, t-stat=3.35).  These results 
generally support my H2, that is, EGCs are more likely being overvalued and tend to have 





Table 12: Tobin's Q comparison between EGCs and non-EGCs 
 Tobin's Q T-statistics Tobin's Q T-statistics 
EGCs 0.764*** (3.01) 0.851*** (3.35) 
     
Size 0.34*** (8.72) 0.34*** (8.63) 
     
Leverage -2.485*** (-6.44) -1.998*** (-5.36) 
     
MB 0.089*** (5.19) 0.089*** (5.22) 
     
Industry Fixed Effect 1.005*** (3.03) 0.733** (2.21) 
Observations 2163  2176  
Adjusted R2 0.418  0.414  
Note: Table 12 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of Tobin’s Q ratio on 
EGCs status. Column 1 includes only post-IPO firm-quarter observations. Column 2 
includes both pre-IPO and post-IPO firm-quarter observations. My interest independent 
variable is EGCs status. Tobin’s Q is calculated as market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets (Kaplan and Zingales,1997; Bebchuk and Cohen 2005). EGCs is 
dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company in its S-1 prospectus, 
zero otherwise. Industry classifications reflect Fama-French 48. T-statistics are presented 
in parentheses and are calculated using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
method. ***, ** and * separately refer to significance (two tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 




Value Relevance of EGCs and non-EGCs  
To test the value relevance of EGCs, I use two market models to examine EGCs’ 
effect. The first model is price-based model, which is based on the models used by Ali 
and Hwang (2000), Collins et al. (1997), Liu and Liu (2007). In this model, firm’s price 
at the end of each quarter is the dependent variable and EGCs status is my interested 
independent variable. I include interaction term between book value of equity per share 
and EGCs status (BVPSi,t* EGCs) and interaction term between earnings per share and 
EGCs status (EPSi,t* EGCs) in the model to test EGCs’ incremental effect on firm’s value 




PRICEi,t = β0 +  β1SIZEi,t + β2BVPSi,t + β3EPSi,t  + β4EGCs  +  β5BVPSi,t* EGCs+ 
+ β 6EPSi,t* EGCs  + INDUSTRYi,t  +  εi,t                                                (3)  
Where: 
PRICEi,t =Stock price, measured at the firm’s fiscal quarter end, for  
firm i at time t; 
Sizei,t= The natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalization at the quarter t;  
BVPS i,t = Book value of equity per share at fiscal quarter-end, for firm i at time t; 
EPS i,t = Earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, for firm i at time t; 
EGCs= Dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company in its  
             S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise; 
INDUSTRYi,t = The Fama-French 48 industry classification for firm i; 
 
Table 13 panel A lists the result for equation 3. The two interaction terms capture 
EGCs’ incremental effect on firms’ value relevance. Specifically, the main effect 
coefficient, book value of equity per share (BVPSi,t), is significantly positive associated 
with quarter end stock price (coefficient=0.976, t-stat=8.99). And the marginal effect 
coefficient, interaction term between book value of equity per share and EGCs status 
(BVPSi,t* EGCs) is significantly negative associated with stock price (coefficient=-8.117, 
t-stat=-6.3). The opposite sign direction of the main effect and the marginal effect show 
that the value relevance of accounting information, specifically book value of equity per 
share, is lower if the IPOs are EGCs. However, I do not find a significant interaction 
coefficient between earnings per share and EGCs status (EPSi,t* EGCs).  
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Return-based model is my second model to test value relevance of EGCs (Ali and 
Hwang 2000). The dependent variable is firm’s quarterly stock return at quarter t, and the 
interest independent variables are the interaction terms between EGCs status and other 
variables.  I establish model 4 to test EGCs’ effect on firms’ value relevance.  
RETURN i,t =  β0  +  β1EPSi,t/Pi,t-1 +  β2ΔEPSi,t/P i,t-1 +  β3EGCs +  β4EPSi,t/P i,t-1* 
EGCs+ β5ΔEPSi,t/P i,t-1* EGCs + β6LOSSi,t + β7EPSi,t/P it-1*LOSSi,t  +  
β8ΔEPSi,t/P i,t-1*LOSS+ β9SIZEi,t  + β10LEVi,t  + INDUSTRYj,i +  εi,t                    (4) 
  Where:  
 
RETURN i,t = Firm’s quarterly stock return at time t, measured as the cumulative 
percentage change in stock price beginning t-1 quarter and ending at quarter 
t, adjusted for dividends and stock splits; 
EPSi,t = Basic earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items and  
adjusted for capital changes, for firm i at quarter t; 
ΔEPS i,t =Quarterly dollar change in basic earnings per share for firm i at  
quarter t;  
Pi,t-1  = Beginning of the quarterly stock price for firm i at quarter t-1; 
EGCs= Dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company in its 
S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise; 
Loss=Dummy one if net income before extraordinary items is negative, and zero 
otherwise; 




Leveragei,t= Financial leverage, calculated as long-term debt scaled by total asset 
for firm i at quarter t; 
INDUSTRYi,t  = Fama-French 48 industry classification for firm i; 
 
Table 13 panel B lists the result for equation 4.  My two interest interaction terms 
are EPSi,t/P i,t-1*EGCs and ΔEPSi,t/P i,t-1* EGCs, which capture EGCs’ incremental effect 
on firms’ earnings per share value relevance. Specifically, both the two main effect 
coefficients, EPSi,t/Pi,t-1* EGCs and ΔEPSi,t/P i,t-1* EGCs, are positive associated with 
quarter end stock price. And the marginal effect of earnings per share, the interaction 
term EPSi,t/P i,t-1*EGCs, is significantly negative associated with return (coefficient=-
2.080, t-stat=-2.01). The opposite sign direction of the main effect and the marginal effect 
shows that the value relevance of accounting information, specifically earnings per share, 
is lower if the IPOs are EGCs. However, I do not find a significant interaction coefficient 
between the change of earnings per share and EGCs status (ΔEPSi,t/P i,t-1* EGCs). In 
general, panel B shows that firms’ accounting information value relevance is lower if the 










Table 13 Panel A: EGCs value relevance and stock price model 
 Expected Sign Price T-statistics 
Size + 0.49*** (17.04) 
    
BVPS + 0.976*** (8.99) 
    
EPS + 0.03 (1.53) 
    
EGCs - -8.117*** (-6.30) 
    
BVPS_EGCs - -0.326** (-2.30) 
    
EPS_EGCs - -0.03 (-1.41) 
    
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
Observations  2421  
Adjusted R2  0.525  
Note: Table 13 panel A reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of quarter end 
stock price on EGCs status and the interaction terms between EGCs and accounting basic 
information. EGCs is dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company 
in its S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise. Industry classifications reflect Fama-French 48. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses and are calculated using White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent method. ***, ** and * separately refer to significance (two 














Table 13 Panel B: EGCs value relevance and return model 
 Expected Sign Quarterly Return T-statistics 
EPSi,t/Pi,t-1 + 0.407 (0.39) 
    
ΔEPSit/P it-1 + 0.111 (0.25) 
    
EGCs - -0.006 (-0.26) 
    
EPSi,t/Pi,t-1* EGCs - -2.080** (-2.01) 
    
ΔEPSit/P it-1* EGCs - -0.256 (-0.40) 
    
Loss - -0.023 (-1.21) 
    
EPSi,t/Pi,t-1*Loss / -1.614* (-1.85) 
    
ΔEPSit/P it-1*loss / -0.130 (-0.19) 
    
Size + 0.018*** (5.68) 
    
Leverage / -0.041 (-1.20) 
    
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
Observations  2070  
Adjusted R2  0.022  
Note: Table 13 panel B reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of quarter end 
stock price on EGCs status and the interaction terms between EGCs and accounting basic 
information. EGCs is dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth company 
in its S-1 prospectus, zero otherwise. Industry classifications reflect Fama-French 48. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses and are calculated using White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent method. ***, ** and * separately refer to significance (two 
tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Refer to equation 4 for variable descriptions. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 The passage of the JOBS Act by policymakers in April 5, 2012 creates a new 
category of IPO firms, EGCs. To be qualified as EGCs, new firms need to meet several 
requirements. The key requirement is that the new listed firms’ revenue should be lower 
than 1 billion dollars threshold before IPO.  For those emerging small companies 
identified as EGCs, they can take advantage of less regulations and disclosure 
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requirement. Regulators anticipate that this reduced regulation and disclosure can ease 
the process for those emerging firms to help them raise capital more easily. Therefore, 
this new passed act tries to change the trend that fewer and fewer new firms are listed in 
United States in the recent 10 years.   
However, very limited research examines those EGCs performance in the capital 
market. To fill this gap, this study comprehensively examines EGCs’ financial 
performance, Tobin’s Q and value relevance compared with non-EGCs. My findings 
suggest that EGCs tend to have lower financial performance compared with non-EGCs. 
This study uses return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and firm’s quarterly stock 
return (Return) to measure EGCs’ financial performance. My results show that EGCs 
tend to have significantly lower ROA and ROE.  Tobin’s Q is a proxy illustrating whether 
the firm is overvalued and undervalued. My results show that EGCs tend to have higher 
Tobin’s Q compared with non-EGCs. This result indicates that EGCs are more likely 
being overvalued than non-EGCs. Lastly, I examine the value relevance of EGCs. By 
employing the stock price model and return model of value relevance, my results show 
that the value relevance of accounting information for EGCs tends to be lower. 
My results shed light on understanding balance between the JOBS Act’s benefit and 
unintended consequences. Weaker financial performance of EGCs shows that less 
vigorous regulation might stimulate weaker performance firms to issue new shares and 
thus might have detrimental effect on investors’ protection. Future research can 






IPO UNDERPRICING AND MANAGER ABILITY 
1. Introduction 
Prior literature suggests that the two parties that have the most influence over the 
IPO offer price are the issuing firm and lead underwriter (Bradley et al. 2004; Ljungqvist 
2007). The success of a start-up firm has also been found to be more sensitive to good 
managerial practices than that of an established firm (Bruton et al. 2010). Managerial 
ability influences several factors key to the bargaining power of the issuing firm 
including financial reporting quality, determination of the percentage of the firm to sell, 
and the caliber of underwriter and auditor retained for the IPO. All of these factors 
significantly influence the level of information asymmetry surrounding the valuation of 
an IPO (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Boulton et al. 2011; Butler et al. 2014; Leone and 
Willenborg 2007; Ljungqvist 2007; Teoh et al. 1998). However, few studies have 
examined the impact of managerial ability on IPO underpricing, and none to the best of 
my knowledge have examined whether compensation structure influences the directional 
impact of managerial ability on IPO underpricing. In this study, I examine the 
relationship between IPO underpricing and managerial ability; I also test whether that 
relationship is significantly influenced by executive equity ownership.  
Although managerial ability significantly influences financial reporting quality, 
there is mixed evidence as to its impact. Prior literature suggests that better managers 
produce higher quality earnings and have more negotiation power in determining the IPO 
offer price (Bradley et al. 2004; Demerjian et al. 2012a; Demerjian et al. 2013). 
Alternatively, Demerjian et al. (2012b), find that better managers may behave 
62 
 
opportunistically in order to increase compensation or to protect their reputation. 
However, the manager’s behavior is dependent upon the relative costs of behaving 
opportunistically. Francis et al. (2008) suggest that although more reputed CEOs are 
associated with lower earnings quality, it is not because the CEOs are engaging in 
opportunistic behavior, but because poor earnings quality firms require more talented 
management. As such, I anticipate that managerial ability will be negatively associated 
with IPO underpricing. 
Managers also influence ownership and control of the issuing firm through their 
compensation structure and by determining the percentage of the firm to sell in an IPO. 
Several studies suggest that executive compensation influences the extent of IPO 
underpricing (Alavi et al. 2008; Bruton et al. 2010; Demerjian et al. 2012a; Falato et al. 
2011; Graham et al. 2013; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003; McBain and Krause 1989; 
Pukthuanthong et al. 2007; Rajgopal et al. 2006). Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find 
that IPO underpricing is negatively related to the CEO’s fraction of pre-IPO ownership. 
Bruton et al. (2010) and McBain and Krause (1989) provide evidence that retained inside 
ownership in an issuing firm also signals management’s belief in the value of the firm to 
outside investors. Thus CEOs whose compensation structure is comprised primarily of 
equity are particularly sensitive to losses from IPO underpricing and have incentive to 
reduce underpricing (Alavi et al. 2008; Ljungqvist 2007). To the extent that their 
compensation is composed of equity ownership, I expect better managers to mitigate IPO 
underpricing. I also hypothesize that better managers will sell fewer of their shares during 
the IPO given that managerial ability is positively associated with earnings quality, firm 
performance, and stock returns.  
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Using a sample of 2,964 IPOs during the period from January 1976 to December 
2013, I test the impact of manager ability on IPO underpricing. Following prior literature 
(Bhagat et al. 2011; Demerjian et al. 2012), I use several manager ability measures. I find 
that all of my manager ability measures are associated with lower IPO underpricing after 
controlling for other firm characteristics known to affect IPO underpricing, but only two 
of the three measures significantly reduce underpricing.  
My study contributes to the literature by examining the impact of human capital 
on IPO underpricing. In addition, my study helps to resolve the mixed empirical findings 
related to the relationship between managerial ability and financial reporting quality; my 
results are consistent with the argument that better managers will produce higher quality 
earnings to avoid reputation loss given the heightened scrutiny surrounding an IPO. The 
findings of this study are valuable to issuing firms considering hiring higher caliber 
managers and investors in evaluating IPO firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the 
literature review and hypothesis development, section 3 describes the research design and 
empirical models, section 4 presents the empirical results, section 5 presents the 
sensitivity analysis and robustness checks, and section 6 concludes.  
2.         Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
IPO underpricing is defined as pricing an IPO substantially lower than its market 
value at the end of the first trading day. Although prior literature suggests that IPO 
underpricing can be linked to several factors, my study focus on two that are significantly 
influenced by managerial ability, information asymmetry and ownership and control.  
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Several studies provide evidence that IPO underpricing is negatively associated 
with earnings quality because higher quality earnings reduces the level of information 
asymmetry between the issuing firm and outside investors (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; 
Boulton et al. 2011; Butler et al. 2014; Leone and Willenborg 2007; Ljungqvist 2007; 
Teoh et al. 1998). Ball and Shivakumar (2008) show that firms improve financial 
reporting quality prior to IPOs. Boulton et al. (2011) provide evidence that IPOs are 
underpriced less in countries where public firms produce higher quality earnings. More 
frequent and higher quality disclosures are also associated with less IPO underpricing 
(Boulton et al. 2011; Leone and Willenborg 2007). Managers directly impact the level of 
information asymmetry through financial reporting and disclosures. Francis et al. (2008) 
suggest that managers’ career concerns influence their financial reporting decisions, and 
that CEO reputation is a significant factor in explaining firms’ earnings quality. Although 
managerial ability significantly influences financial reporting quality, there is mixed 
evidence as to its impact.  
Several studies suggest that better managers produce higher quality earnings and 
have more negotiation power in determining the IPO offer price (Bradley et al. 2004; 
Demerjian et al. 2012a; Demerjian et al. 2013). Demerjian et al. (2013) provide evidence 
that managerial ability is positively associated with earnings quality. Demerjian et al. 
(2012b) find that higher ability managers engage in less total earnings management, 
which is consistent with the argument that managers are concerned with reputation loss 
as a result of earnings management. Alternatively, prior literature also suggests that better 
managers may behave opportunistically in order to increase compensation or to protect 
their reputation (Cheng et al. 2011; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Demerjian et al. 2012b; 
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Grant et al. 2009). However, the manager’s behavior is dependent upon the relative costs 
of behaving opportunistically. Demerjian et al. (2012b) find weak evidence that better 
managers engage in less accrual-based earnings management than worse managers. In 
addition, Tan and Jamal (2006) demonstrate that high foresight managers that have 
knowledge about future earnings are in a better position to smooth earnings than low 
foresight managers with limited knowledge. Although Francis et al. (2008) find that more 
reputed CEOs are associated with lower earnings quality, they suggest that this is not the 
result of the CEOs engaging in opportunistic behavior, but because poor earnings quality 
firms require more talented management. Francis et al. (2008) also state that, “reputed 
CEOs have more to lose, in terms of their own human capital, if they make accounting 
and disclosure choices that result in poor discretionary quality.” Although the relationship 
between financial reporting quality and managerial ability is mixed, the majority of the 
evidence suggests that the career concerns of better managers will deter their involvement 
in opportunistic behavior, which leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Managerial ability is negatively associated with IPO underpricing. 
Managers also influence ownership and control of the issuing firm through their 
compensation structure and by determining the percentage of the firm to sell in an IPO. 
Agency theory suggests that equity-based compensation can be used to align the interests 
of managers and owners (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Several studies suggest that 
executive compensation influences the extent of IPO underpricing, and that more 
reputable managers receive higher compensation (Alavi et al. 2008; Bruton et al. 2010; 
Demerjian et al. 2012a; Falato et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2013; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
2003; McBain and Krause 1989; Pukthuanthong et al. 2007; Rajgopal et al. 2006). 
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Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find that IPO underpricing is negatively related to the 
CEO’s fraction of pre-IPO ownership. McBain and Krause (1989) find that higher 
offering price-earnings ratios are strongly related to larger insider equity ownership. Thus 
CEOs whose compensation structure is comprised primarily of equity are particularly 
sensitive to losses from IPO underpricing and have incentive to reduce underpricing 
(Alavi et al. 2008; Ljungqvist 2007). To the extent that their compensation is composed 
of equity ownership, I expect that better managers to mitigate IPO underpricing. 
H2: Managerial ability’s effect on IPO underpricing is more pronounced if 
CEOs have high levels of equity ownership. 
3.  Research Design and Empirical Models 
Sample and Data 
I obtain the US IPOs of common equity information from Thomson Financial 
Securities Data new issues database (SDC).  I obtain financial statement information and 
financial market information from Compustat and CRSP. My original sample from SDC 
consists of 11,399 IPOs from 1976-2011. Following Zheng and Stangeland (2007), I 
exclude American Depository Receipts (ADRs), unit issues, certificates, beneficial 
interest, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and banking firms. All 
firms in my sample are covered by the Jay Ritter’s data set of IPO founding dates. I 
further eliminate observations that lack control variables from SDC, Compustat, CRSP 
and my major variables of managerial ability. My final sample consists of 2,964 IPOs 
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from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 2011 in the United States.1 Table 1 summarizes 
the sample selection process.  
Initial Public Offerings Underpricing 
Initial public offerings underpricing (IPO underpricing) is the dependent variable 
in this study. IPO underpricing, also called “money left on the table”, is a widely 
observed phenomenon internationally. When firms go public, the offer price set by 
investment banks is usually lower than the first day closing price. The difference is the 
IPO underpricing, which is considered as an incentive for investors to bear the risks of 
buying the shares. Equation (1) specifies the formula for IPO underpricing: 
IPO Underpricing= (first day closing price-offer price)/offer price    (1) 
In the regression model, I take the natural logarithm of (1+IPO underpricing) to 
avoid the effect of extreme observations. 
Managerial Ability and CEO Monitoring Motivation 
           Following Demerjian et al. (2012), I measure the general managers’ ability using 
MA-Score. Demerjian et al. (2012) show that MA-score has advantage to attribute the 
firms’ performance and efficiency to managers compared with other measures such as 
historical returns, media citations, and manager fixed effects (Fee and Hadlock 2003; 
Milbourn 2012; Francis et al. 2008).  Specifically, MA-score performs better to 
distinguish the effect of the manager from the effect of the firm and keep a larger sample 
of firms. So I use this MA-score to proxy the general managers’ skills and ability for a 
                                                          
1 My sample size is comparable to Zheng and Stangeland (2007) and Green and Hwang 
(2012). Following Zheng and Stangeland (2007) sample selection criteria, my sample includes 
3997 IPOs from 1982 to 1998 while their sample includes 3897 IPOs.  Following Green and 
Hwang (2012) sample selection criteria, my sample includes 8098 observations from 1976 to 
2012 while Green and Hwang (2012) has 7975 observations from 1975 to 2008. My result 
remains qualitatively the same if I use alternative sample selection criteria. 
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firm in a specific year.  I also use CEO cash compensation to measure managerial ability. 
Prior literature shows that high compensated managers tend to have higher ability to 
operate the firm and generate revenue.  I take natural logarithm value of CEO cash 
compensation to avoid extreme observation effect. 
Lastly, I use CEO working experience as an indicator of managerial ability. The 
number of years as an executive as of one year before IPO indicates the top managers’ 
working skills and knowledge. More number of years working experience shows 
managers’ better working skills, knowledge and ability.  I use CEO shareholding 
percentage before IPO as an indicator of CEO’s monitoring motivation of the IPO 
process. The higher the CEO shareholding percentage before the IPO, the higher the 
CEO’s motivation to monitor the IPO process. Especially, I categorize the CEO 
motivation as dummy one if CEO shareholding percentage is higher than the median 
value of CEO shareholding percentage in the sample, zero otherwise. 
Control Variables 
Following the prior literature, my control variables include firm characteristics 
variables and deal characteristics variables. Firm characteristics include firm age, 
exchange market where the IPO listed, and whether the firm belongs to high technology 
firms.   Longer established firms have better available information and are expected to 
have lower IPO underpricing (Beatty and Ritter 1986). I include logarithm value of age 
(Lnage) in the model. IPO firms listed in NYSE and AMEX are considered listing in the 
renowned stock exchange market, and tend to have lower IPO underpricing (Lowry et al. 
2010). I include a dummy variable (NYSEAMEX) coded as one if the stock is listed in 
NYSE or AMEX. High technology firms are considered to have more information 
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asymmetry and involve more risk. Thus high technology firms tend to have higher IPO 
underpricing. I include a dummy variable (Hightech) coded as one if the firm is 
considered to be a high technology firms. I include firm’s total asset before IPO (Lnat) 
and firm’s book to market ratio (BM) as additional firm characteristics control variables.  
Deal characteristics include IPO proceeds, IPO underwriter bank rank, whether 
the firm’s offer price is an integer, and auditor’s reputation rank.  Bradley et al. (2004) 
report that IPOs with integer prices experience higher underpricing. Bradley et al. (2004) 
also suggest that underwriters bargain power of a finer offer price increases as the 
uncertainty surrounding firm value declines. Thus, for IPOs that are particularly difficult 
to value tend to have integer offer price. I include a dummy variable (Intpdummy) coded 
as one if the offer price is an integer. Prior literature finds that highly ranked underwriters 
and auditing firms tend to have lower underpricing, which is called the certification effect 
(Carter and Manaster 1990). But recent literature finds that high rank of auditors and 
underwriters might have a positive relationship with IPO underpricing, which is called 
the reverse certification effect (Loughran and Ritter 2004).  I include a dummy variable 
(Topunderwriter) coded as one if the lead underwriter’s (Carter and Manster,1990) rank 
is greater than or equal to eight.2 I also include a dummy variable (VC) if the issuing firm 
has venture capital banking (Barry et al. 1990).  I include a variable (Priceupdate) to 
indicate the percent change between the offer price and the average of the high and low 
initial filing prices. I calculate it as IPO share price / mid-point of initial share price range 
                                                          
2 Loughran and Ritter (2004) updates underwriter prestige rankings based on Carter and 
Manaster (1990) methodology. In Ritter’s website, Underwriter’s ranking is updated to 2011. For 
the IPO observations that are after 2011, I adopts the average ranking value from 1980-2011. 
Since the underwriters’ ranking is relatively stable, I also make the post-2011 underwriter ranking 
value equal to the most recent year’s ranking value as an alternative measure for post-2011 
observations. Results are similar with these alternative measurements.   
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as filed with SEC, and I expect it has positive relation with the IPO underpricing. I 
include a dummy variable (Pureprimary) to indicate whether offerings consist of primary 
shares only, and I expect it has positive relation with IPO underpricing. Finally, I include 
a dummy variable (Topauditor) to indicate whether the firm’s auditor belongs to big4, 
big6, or big8. I expect that it has a negative relation with IPO underpricing.  
4.  Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 14 reports industry sample selection of IPOs from 1976 to 2011. The 
original US IPOs pulled from SDC include 11,399 observations. Table 15 lists 
descriptive statistics of all variables used in the main regression model. The mean value 
of logarithm underpricing in my sample is 0.168.  83.7 percent of the IPOs in my sample 
is audited by top auditors (big4/6/8). 44.8 percent of the IPOs in the sample is backed by 
venture capitalists.  16.8 percent of the IPOs goes public on premium stock exchanges 
like NYSE and AMEX. 54 percent of the IPOs in the sample has premium 
bookrunner/underwriter. The average book to market ratio for my sample IPOs is 0.594. 
The mean value of the first measurement of managerial ability is 0.007. The mean value 
of the second measurement of managerial ability is 0.105. And the mean value of the 











Table 14: Sample selection procedure 
Sample selection procedure 
Number of 
observations 
Initial public offering--selection of common shares issued in US 
from SDC(1976-2011) 11399 
   Merge with Ritter’s dataset of IPO founding dates (9826 
observations) (4486) 
   Delete ADR and unit issues (118) 
   Delete certificates and beneficial interest (28) 
   Delete close-ends funds and Real estate investment trust (REITs) (110) 
   Delete banking firms (SIC 6000-6199) (404) 
   Delete offer price<5 dollars (412) 
   Delete control variables financial data missing and managerial 
ability measure missing (2877) 





















Table 15: Variables descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
Lnunder 2964 0.168 0.259 0.005 0.087 0.232 
Ability1 2964 0.007 0.170 -0.096 0.005 0.105 
Ability2 478 6.312 0.679 5.886 6.215 6.745 
Ability3 394 1.537 0.932 0.693 1.609 2.197 
Monitor 555 0.429 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Intpdummy 2964 0.808 0.394 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NYSEAMEX 2964 0.168 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hightech 2964 0.440 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Topauditor 2964 0.837 0.370 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VC 2964 0.448 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Priceupdate 2964 1.000 0.137 0.923 1.000 1.081 
Lnprcd 2964 3.641 1.124 2.923 3.665 4.332 
Pureprimary 2964 0.590 0.492 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Lnage 2964 2.340 0.979 1.609 2.197 2.944 
Topunderwriter 2964 0.540 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BM 2964 0.594 35.851 -0.029 0.142 0.287 
Lnat 2964 3.674 1.737 2.565 3.541 4.671 
Crisis_Big 2964 0.014 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Table 15 reports the variables descriptive statistics based on 2964 IPOs during the 
period 1976-2011. Refer to Appendix B for variable descriptions. 
 
 
Table 16 lists the correlation matrix among all the main variables. The variables 
of interest in my study are the managerial ability proxies. I find that all of the three 
measurements of managerial ability (Ability1/Ability2/Ability3) are significantly negative 





Table 16: Correlation matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Lnunder 1 -                  
Ability1 2 -0.084 -                 
Ability2 3 -0.246 -0.021 -                
Ability3 4 -0.126 0.065 -0.026 -               
Monitor 5 0.090 0.087 -0.166 0.377 -              
Intpdummy 6 0.152 -0.048 -0.017 -0.155 0.016 -             
NYSEAMEX 7 -0.122 0.104 0.396 -0.123 -0.119 -0.058 -            
Hightech 8 0.171 -0.090 -0.301 -0.053 0.034 0.051 -0.217 -           
Topauditor 9 0.069 -0.024 -0.034 0.047 0.004 0.018 -0.033 0.079 -          
VC 10 0.176 -0.107 -0.315 -0.042 0.142 0.099 -0.245 0.380 0.134 -         
Priceupdate 11 0.466 -0.011 -0.175 -0.081 0.075 0.109 -0.048 0.105 0.054 0.060 -        
Lnprcd 12 0.189 -0.019 0.296 -0.212 -0.118 0.141 0.386 0.027 0.078 0.043 0.223 -       
Pureprimary 13 0.097 -0.223 -0.019 -0.068 -0.074 0.068 -0.071 0.072 0.038 0.057 -0.036 -0.066 -      
Lnage 14 -0.171 0.157 0.321 0.058 -0.119 -0.068 0.275 -0.244 -0.032 -0.242 -0.083 0.237 -0.200 -     
Topunderwriter 15 0.138 -0.038 0.069 -0.122 -0.031 0.072 0.217 0.071 0.078 0.151 0.093 0.548 0.011 0.104 -    
BM 16 -0.004 -0.007 0.009 0.052 -0.035 0.008 -0.010 0.019 0.010 0.019 -0.005 -0.008 0.008 0.005 0.017 -   
Lnat 17 -0.014 0.037 0.457 -0.161 -0.152 0.032 0.485 -0.185 0.049 -0.112 0.007 0.783 -0.083 0.408 0.458 -0.002 -  
Crisis_Big 18 -0.020 -0.014 0.087 -0.047 0.046 -0.007 0.053 -0.020 -0.094 0.018 -0.064 0.006 -0.039 -0.028 0.030 0.021 0.030 - 
Note: Table 16 is the Pearson correlation coefficients for variables in my primary analysis. The correlations are based on 2964 IPO firms during the period 1976-2011. Correlations 
that are significant at the 10% level or better are presented in bold. Refer to Appendix B for variable descriptions.
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Testing the Effect of Managerial Ability on IPO Underpricing 
In equation (2), I examine the effect of managerial ability on IPO underpricing.  
Lnunder=β0+ β1 Intpdummy+β2 NYSEAMEX +β3 Hightech +β4 Topauditor+ 
β5VC+β6 Priceupdate +β7 Lnprcd +β8 Pureprimary +β9 Lnage +  
β10 Topunderwriter + β11 BM +β12 Lnat +β13 Crisis_Big+β14 Abilityi +  
Industry and Year Fixed effect +ε                                                                     (2) 
In equation (2), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm value of (1+IPO 
underpricing). All the other control variables are defined in Appendix B. The primary 
variable of interest is managerial ability (Abilityi). In table 17, I include three models to 
apply ordinary least square (OLS) regression of equation (2). Model 1 uses managerial 
ability measurement (Ability1) calculated by Demerjian et al. (2012) method. In model 1, 
managerial ability is significantly negative related with IPO underpricing (Ability1=-
0.037, t-stat=-3.1). Model 2 uses managerial ability measurement (Ability2) calculated by 
natural logarithm of CEO cash compensation. In model 2, managerial ability is also 
negatively correlated with IPO underpricing (Ability2=-0.029, t-stat=-1.95). In model 3, 
managerial ability (Ability3) is negatively related with IPO underpricing but insignificant. 
The insignificance result of model 3 might be due to the significantly reduced 
observations of 455 IPOs in the model compared with 2964 observations in model 1 and 
558 observations in model 2. In general, I find managerial ability proxies are negatively 
associated with IPO underpricing. This result suggests that high ability managers 
emphasize more about their reputation and involve less opportunistic behaviors in the 
IPO setting. And these less opportunistic behaviors are translated by the market as good 
indication and finally are associated with lower IPO underpricing. I also measure the 
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managerial ability based on historical return and historical ROA. IPO firms do not have 
return values before IPO so I replace historical return with latest fiscal year revenue/total 
assets ratio. The historical ROA is the one year ahead return on assets income before 
extraordinary items before IPO scaled by average total assets (AT) at year t-1. I have 
similar results for those measures. For example, when I include historical ROA as one 
measure of managerial ability, the coefficient for historical return is -0.118 and it is 
marginally significant (p-value = 0.12). I do not include these two measures because the 
sample reduces significantly since lots of IPO firms do not report these two variables’ 
information. For example, my sample will only include 219 observations if I measure 
managerial ability by historical ROA. 
Turing to the control variables, integer offer price dummy (Intpdummy) and 
priceupdate dummy (Priceupdate) are significantly positively associated with IPO 
underpricing, consistent with Bradley et al. (2004). High technology variable (Hightech) 
is positively associated with IPO underpricing, consistent with prior literature that 
indicates high technology IPOs tend to have higher IPO underpricing. IPOs listed on 
renowned exchange (NYSEAMEX) and with longer history in the market (lnage) tend to 
have lower IPO underpricing. The auditors of IPO (Topauditor) are negatively associated 
with IPO underpricing, consistent with signaling theory that indicates association with 
top auditors sends positive signals to the market. IPOs backed by venture capitalist tend 
to have higher IPO underpricing, consistent with Barry (1990). IPOs underwritten by top 
investment banks tend to have higher IPO underpricing, consistent with Loughran and 
Ritter’s (2004) reverse certification argument. Finally, IPOs have larger asset before 
offering tend to have lower IPO underpricing.  
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Table 17: Managerial ability and IPO underpricing 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intpdummy 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (3.14) (3.05) (2.64) 
    
NYSEAMEX -0.052** -0.061* -0.058* 
 (-1.97) (-1.94) (-1.77) 
    
Hightech 0.039*** -0.008 0.043* 
 (3.36) (-0.42) (1.85) 
    
Topauditor -0.027* -0.028 -0.028 
 (-1.78) (-1.00) (-0.93) 
    
VC 0.034*** 0.068** 0.079** 
 (5.59) (2.07) (2.40) 
    
Priceupdate 0.644*** 0.686*** 0.706*** 
 (10.89) (7.19) (7.02) 
    
Lnprcd 0.064*** 0.076** 0.071** 
 (5.53) (2.51) (2.23) 
    
Pureprimary 0.058** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 (2.52) (3.46) (3.44) 
    
Lnage -0.018*** -0.009 -0.012 
 (-3.86) (-0.77) (-1.16) 
    
Topunderwriter 0.033*** 0.067** 0.064*** 
           (3.14) (2.53) (2.69) 
    
BM 0.00005** 0.00005** 0.00004 
 (2.34) (2.01) (1.20) 
    
Lnat -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.035** 
 (-11.69) (-2.96) (-2.50) 
    
Crisis_Big 0.0226 -0.0281 -0.127 
 (0.62) (-0.32) (-1.33) 
    
Ability1 -0.037***   
 (-3.10)   
    
Ability2  -0.029*  
  (-1.95)  
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 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Ability3   -0.01 
   (-0.86) 
Industry Fixed Effect                       Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2964 558 455 
Adjusted R2 0.337 0.341 0.329 
Note: Table 17 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of IPO underpricing on 
managerial ability. The IPO underpricing is the logarithm value of (1+firm first day 
trading return). Model 1 measures managerial ability using Demerjian et al. (2012) 
measurement. Model 2 measures managerial ability as natural logarithm of CEO cash 
compensation, including salary and bonus. Model 3 measures managerial ability as 
natural logarithm the number of years an executive has been listed as CEO by 
Execucomp as of one year before IPO. I include industry fixed effect and year fixed 
effect in the models as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. All t-statistics are 
calculated with two-way clustered standard errors by firm and by year. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * separately refer to significance (two tailed) at the 

















Effect of Monitoring Motivation on the Relation between Managerial Ability and 
IPO Underpricing 
I set up equation (3) to examine the monitoring effect of CEO motivation on the 
relation between managerial ability and IPO underpricing. 
Lnunder=β0+ β1 Intpdummy+β2 NYSEAMEX +β3 Hightech +β4 
Topauditor+β5VC+β6Priceupdate +β7 Lnprcd +β8 Pureprimary +β9 Lnage  
+β10 Topunderwriter + β11 BM +β12 Lnat +β13 Crisis_Big+β14 Abilityi+β15 
Monitor+ β16 Abilityi_ Monitor+Industry and Year Fixed effect +ε                    (3) 
In equation (3), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm value of (1+IPO 
underpricing).  All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The primary variable of 
interest is the interaction term between managerial ability (Abilityi) and CEO motivation 
(Monitor). In table 18, model 1 uses managerial ability measurement (Ability1) calculated 
by Demerjian et al. (2012) method. The interaction term between managerial ability and 
CEO motivation (Ability1_Monitor) is significantly negative (Ability1_Monitor=-0.007, t-
stat=-2.32). The interaction term is in the same direction with the ability predictor, which 
suggests that the relation between managerial ability and IPO underpricing tends to be 
more pronounced if the CEO have higher motivation. Model 2 uses managerial ability 
measurement (Ability2) calculated by natural logarithm of CEO cash compensation. In 
model 2, the interaction term between managerial ability and CEO compensation 
(Ability2_Monitor=-0.05, t-stat=-1.79) is significantly negative, suggesting that managerial 
ability reduces IPO underpricing more significantly if the CEO plays a more important 
monitoring role. In model 3, the interaction term of managerial ability and CEO 
compensation (Ability3_Monitor=-0.017, t-stat=-0.2) is negatively related with IPO 
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underpricing but insignificant. In general, the interaction term between managerial ability 
and CEO motivation has the same sign with the predictor managerial ability, suggesting 
that the effect of managerial ability on IPO underpricing becomes more significant when 
CEO has high motivation to monitor the IPO process. This result also indicates that 
CEOs whose compensation structure highly depend on equity are particularly sensitive to 
losses from IPO underpricing and have incentive to reduce underpricing. The control 



















Table 18: Managerial ability, CEO monitoring motivation and IPO underpricing 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intpdummy 0.017 0.022 0.018 
 (0.36) (0.28) (0.20) 
    
NYSEAMEX -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.05** 
 (-3.42) (-5.34) (-2.55) 
    
Hightech 0.0171 -0.09*** -0.07** 
 (0.31) (-14.32) (-2.32) 
    
Topauditor -0.004** -0.000 -0.047*** 
 (-2.43) (-0.01) (-9.07) 
    
VC 0.029 0.033 0.064 
 (0.91) (1.35) (0.81) 
    
Priceupdate 0.763* 0.713*** 0.790*** 
 (1.88) (5.10) (4.15) 
    
Lnprcd 0.03** 0.016 -0.005 
 (2.07) (0.58) (-0.12) 
    
Pureprimary 0.04** 0.044 0.041 
 (2.10) (1.52) (1.20) 
    
Lnage 0.0001 -0.003 0.019*** 
 (0.02) (-0.16) (6.04) 
    
Topunderwriter 0.01 -0.003 0.009 
 (0.50) (-0.03) (0.08) 
    
BM 0.00004*** 0.00001 -0.00001 
 (5.17) (0.34) (-0.13) 
    
Lnat -0.005 -0.023*** -0.003 
 (-0.46) (-4.60) (-0.20) 
    
Crisis_Big -0.013 -0.053 0.019 
 (-0.28) (-1.01) (0.41) 
    
Monitor -0.006 0.348** 0.052 
 (-0.46) (2.43) (0.59) 
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 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Ability1 -0.007   
 (-0.51)   
Ability1_Monitor -0.007**   
 (-2.32)   
    
Ability2  -0.023  
  (-0.55)  
    
Ability2_Monitor  -0.05*  
  (-1.79)  
    
Ability3   -0.015 
   (-0.98) 
    
Ability3_Monitor   -0.017 
   (-0.20) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 554 138 118 
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.359 0.319 
Note: Table 18 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression of IPO underpricing on 
managerial ability. The IPO underpricing is the logarithm value of (1+firm first day 
trading return). Model 1 measures managerial ability using Demerjian et al. (2012) 
measurement. Model 2 measures managerial ability as natural logarithm of CEO cash 
compensation, including salary and bonus. Model 3 measures managerial ability as 
natural logarithm the number of years an executive has been listed as CEO by 
Execucomp as of one year before IPO. Monitor is categorized as dummy one if CEO 
shareholding percentage is higher than the median value of CEO shareholding percentage 
in the sample, zero otherwise I include industry fixed effect and year fixed effect in the 
models as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. All t-statistics are calculated with 
two-way clustered standard errors by firm and by year. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * separately refer to significance (two tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 









5.        Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks   
My results are robust to a wide range of alternative specifications. Firstly, many 
observations in SDC do not have information about total asset and book-to-market ratio. 
To include these two variables in my main empirical model reduces my sample size from 
3909 to 2964. I re-run my empirical model without adding these two variables. My major 
empirical results are still qualitatively the same. For example, without including the two 
additional controls, the managerial ability (Ability1) is still negatively significant with 
IPO underpricing (Ability1= -0.031, p-value=0.000). Secondly, I use rank value to replace 
with the raw value of managerial ability score. My results qualitatively hold. Thirdly, I 
use alternative industry classification (Fama-French 38 and SIC2), truncate the sample at 
1% level and winsorize the data at 3% level, my main results are qualitatively the same.   
6.  Conclusion 
My study contributes to the literature by examining the impact of human capital 
on IPO underpricing phenomenon. By employing a new measurement of managerial 
ability, I find that more capable managers help reducing the IPO underpricing.  In 
addition, my study helps to resolve the mixed empirical findings related to the 
relationship between managerial ability and financial reporting quality; my results show 
that better managers will produce higher quality earnings to avoid reputation loss given 
the heightened scrutiny surrounding an IPO. The findings of this study are valuable to 









This dissertation examines the impact of the JOBS Act on IPO market and the 
underpricing phenomenon. My first study results suggest that EGC firms have lower 
direct financing cost after the JOBS Act. I argue that this is due to the less disclosure 
requirement and regulation requirement for EGCs. I also find that the hidden indirect cost 
for IPOs increases significantly after the JOBS Act. These results echoes current 
academics’ concerns that the reduction of regulation for EGCs might lead to negative 
consequences.  In conclusion, my findings in the first study show that the policymaker 
and regulators’ purpose in enacting the JOBS Act is at partially satisfied. The unintended 
consequence is that the information asymmetry for those EGCs also increases because of 
less vigorous regulation. My first study contributes to the literature on documenting the 
empirical evidence of benefit and cost of the JOBS Act. It also offers new empirical 
findings of voluntary disclosure of use-of-proceeds usage in the EGCs’ IPO process.   
My second study addresses policymakers’ concerns of EGCs financial 
performance. For EGCs, they can take advantage of less regulations and disclosure 
requirement that regular IPOs are not qualified to apply. Policymakers anticipate that this 
reduced regulation and disclosure can ease the process for EGCs to raise capital.  
However, my second study suggests that the JOBS Act might also lead to unintended 
consequences. Specifically, I show that EGCs tend to have lower financial performance, 
higher Tobin’s Q and lower accounting value relevance.   
In the third study, my results contribute to understand the impact of human capital 
on IPO underpricing phenomenon. I find that more capable managers help reducing the 
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information asymmetry and thus reducing the IPO underpricing.  In addition, my study 
implies that better managers will produce higher quality earnings to avoid reputation loss 
given the heightened scrutiny surrounding an IPO. The findings of this study are valuable 
to issuing firms considering hiring more capable managers and investors in evaluating 
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Appendix A: Variables definitions 
Variables   Definitions 
EGCs = Dummy one if a firm identify itself as an emerging growth 
company in its S-1 prospectus between April 5, 2012 and April 5, 
2015 
HDis  = Dummy one if the firms' voluntary disclosed IPO proceeds usages 
are greater than the sample mean, zero otherwise 
Postact = Dummy one if the firm issues IPO after April 5, 2012 
JOBS_Affected = Dummy one if the IPO has revenue below the 1 billion revenue 
cutoff point 
Postact* JOBS             = Interaction term between Postact and JOBS_Affected dummy 
JOBSHDis  = Dummy one if the firm has revenue below the 1 billion revenue 
cutoff point and the voluntary disclosed IPO proceeds usages are 
greater than the sample mean, zero otherwise. 
JOBSLDis = Dummy oneif the firm has revenue above the 1 billion revenue 
cutoff point and the voluntary disclosed IPO proceeds usages are 
smaller than the sample mean, zero otherwise.  
EGCs*HDis = Interaction term between EGCs and Hdis 
Post*JOBSHDis = Interaction term between PostAct and JOBSHDis 
Post*JOBSLDis = Interaction term between PostAct and JOBSHDis 
Underpricing = IPO Underpricing= (first day closing price-offer price)/offer price   
Gross Spread = The cost of issuance, accounting, legal or underwriting fee 
Gross Spread% = Gross Spread scaled by principal amount raised in IPO 
Intpdummy = Dummy one if the IPO initial offer price is an integer, zero 
otherwise 
NYSEAMEX = Dummy one if the IPO are listed in the NYSE or AMEX stock 
exchange, zero otherwise 
Hightech = Dummy one if the firms SIC code are classified as high 
technology firms following Loughran and Ritter 2004, zero 
otherwise 
Topauditor = Dummy one if IPO firm' auditor belongs to big4/big6/big8, zero 
otherwise 
VC = Dummy one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists and 
zero otherwise   
Priceupdate = IPO initial offer price / mid-point of initial share price range as 
filed with SEC 
Lnprcd = Natural logarithm of total proceeds (in million of dollars) 
Pureprimary = Dummy one if the IPO consists of primary shares only 
Lnage = The logarithm value of age of the firm in years at the time of the 
IPO 
Topunderwriter = Dummy one if IPO underwriter prestige ranking is higher or equal 
to eight, zero otherwise. The prestige ranking is based on Carter 
and Manaster 1990 reputation rank 
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Appendix B: Variables definitions 
Variables   Definitions 
Lnunder = Natural logarithm of IPO underpricing. IPO Underpricing= (first 
day closing price-offer price)/offer price  
Intpdummy = Dummy one if the IPO initial offer price is an integer, zero 
otherwise 
NYSEAMEX = Dummy one if the IPO are listed in the NYSE or AMEX stock 
exchange, zero otherwise 
Hightech = Dummy one if the firms SIC code are classified as high 
technology firms following Loughran and Ritter 2004, zero 
otherwise 
Topauditor = Dummy one if IPO firm' auditor belongs to big4/big6/big8, zero 
otherwise 
VC = Dummy one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists and 
zero otherwise   
Priceupdate = IPO initial offer price / mid-point of initial share price range as 
filed with SEC 
Lnprcd = Natural logarithm of total proceeds (in millions of dollars) 
Pureprimary = Dummy one if the IPO consists of primary shares only 
Age = The age of the firm in years at the time of the IPO 
Topunderwriter = Dummy one if IPO underwriter prestige ranking is higher or equal 
to eight, zero otherwise. The prestige ranking is based on Carter 
and Manaster 1990 reputation rank 
Lnat = Natural logarithm of total asset before IPO (in millions of dollars) 
BM = Book value/market value at the IPO 
Ability1 = Managerial ability using Demerjian et al. (2012) measurement 
Ability2 = Natural logarithm of CEO cash compensation, including salary 
and bonus  
Ability3 = Natural logarithm the number of years an executive has been 
listed as CEO by Execucomp as of one year before IPO 
Monitor = Dummy one if CEO shareholding percentage is higher than the 
median value of CEO shareholding percentage in the sample, zero 
otherwise 
Ability_Monitor =   Interaction term between ability measure and CEO monitor 
motivation 
 
